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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 20001049-SC 
v. 
LANCE MICHAEL WEEKS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ON CERTIORARI REVIEW 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before this Court on a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' 
opinion affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's post-judgment motion for a 
restitution hearing. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(a)(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the court of appeals correctly determine that defendant's post-
judgment motion was untimely where Utah's restitution statute 
expressly requires a defendant to request a restitution hearing "at the 
time of sentencing"? 
This Court reviews statutory interpretations for correctness. State v. Burns, 2000 
UT 56,f 15, 4 P.3d 795; State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, f 10, 992 P.2d 986. 
II. Did the court of appeals correctly decide that defendant's right to a 
restitution hearing was not revived through a post-judgment motion on which 
the trial court heard oral argument but refused to take evidence? 
This Court reviews a court of appeals decision for correctness. State v. Visser, 
2000 m 88, f 9,22 P.3d 1242. 
IIL Did the court of appeals correctly apply Robertson in holding that a trial court 
need not make express findings on the factors relevant to determining 
restitution under Utah's restitution statute? 
Whether the court of appeals correctly applied Robertson is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) is attached at Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in three different cases with one count of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, a third degree felony (R. 
2830:3);1 two counts of receipt or transfer of a stolen motor vehicle, second degree 
felonies (R. 3049:3; R. 3239:2-3); and one count of failure to respond to an officer's 
signal to stop, a third degree felony (R. 3239:2-3). On July 6, 1999, pursuant to plea 
negotiations, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted illegal possession or use 
of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor (R. 2830:19, 21-27); one count of 
lThe State will cite to the records in these cases using the same convention applied 
by defendant. See Pet. Br. at 3 n. 1. 
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attempted receipt or transfer of a stolen vehicle, a third degree felony (R. 3049:24, 26-
32); and one count of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree 
felony (R. 3239:22, 24-30). 
On September 10, 1999, defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms in these and 
four other cases (R. 2830:33-34; 3049:39-40; 3239:37-38; R. 70:Tab 2:5, 10; Final order 
in defendant's case no. 991902297).2 The terms were ordered to run consecutively to 
sentences imposed by Judge Noel on pleas to five additional unrelated third degree 
felonies (R. 2830:33-34; 3049:39-40; 3239:37-38; R. 70:Tab 2:5, 10; Final order in 
2Defendant was charged in case no. 991902297 with forgery, a third degree felony, 
and failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony (PSI at 3). He 
pleaded guilty to one count of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third 
degree felony (PSI at 3). 
Defendant was charged in case no. 91903420 with possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony; possession of a controlled substance, a class B 
misdemeanor; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; and driving on a 
suspended license, a class C misdemeanor (PSI at 5). Defendant pleaded guilty to one 
count of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony (PSI at 5). 
Defendant was charged in case no. 991903821 with burglary, a second degree 
felony; theft, a second degree felony; possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony; and possession of a controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor, in connection 
with a theft that occurred on or about December 1, 1998 (PSI at 2). Defendant pleaded 
guilty to one count of attempted burglary, a third degree felony (PSI at 2). 
Defendant was charged in case no. 991904978 with possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor; false identification to a peace officer, a class C misdemeanor; and driving 
on a suspended license, a class C misdemeanor (PSI at 4). Defendant pleaded guilty to 
attempted possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor (PSI 4). 
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defendant's case no. 991902297). Based on information contained in his pre-sentence 
investigation report ("PSI"), defendant was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount 
of $9,104.35 (R. 2830:33-34; 3049:39-40; 3239:37-38; R. 70:Tab 2:10; Final order in 
defendant's case no. 991902297). Defendant did not object to the trial court's restitution 
order or request a restitution hearing at the time of sentencing. He also did not object to 
any material information contained in his PSI upon which his sentences were based (R. 
70:Tab 2). 
Eleven days after the trial court entered its final judgments, defendant filed a 
Motion for Review Hearing requesting a restitution hearing under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-201(4)(e) (R. 2830:37, 3049:41; 3239:39). After hearing oral argument, but without an 
evidentiary hearing, the court denied defendant's motion (R. 2830:40, 42; 3049:45; 
3239:42, 43). Defendant timely appealed (R. 2830:44; 3049:47; 3239:45). 
The court of appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court's restitution 
order. State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273,12 P.3d 110 (Addendum B). Defendant's 
petition for writ of certiorari was granted on February 27, 2001. State v. Weeks, 21 P.3d 
218 (Utah 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On his latest crime spree, which occurred between December 1, 1998 and February 
26, 1999, defendant was caught with methamphetamine and marijuana four times. He 
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also stole three cars, led officers on two high-speed chases through residential areas, and 
forged at least one check. 
Case No. 991903239. On December 16, 1998, Yolanda Garcia reported that her 
1994 Ford Mustang had been stolen from a store parking lot while she shopped (R. 
3239:3). Around 11:30 p.m. that same night, an officer activated his police lights after 
observing the Mustang on the road (R. 3239:3). However, instead of stopping, the driver 
of the Mustang accelerated to over seventy miles per hour through a residential area (R. 
3239:3). After running through four different stop signs and making numerous turns, the 
driver eventually stopped the car, got out, and ran away (R. 3239:3). A letter addressed to 
defendant and defendant's finger prints were found inside the Mustang (R. 3239:3-4). 
Defendant was charged with receiving a stolen motor vehicle, a second degree 
felony, and failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony (R. 
3239:2-3). The State dismissed the stolen motor vehicle charge in exchange for 
defendant's guilty plea to failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop (R. 3239:22, 24-
30). 
Case No. 991903049. On December 19, 1998, three days after the Mustang theft, 
David Hatton reported that his 1992 Honda Accord had been stolen from his driveway, 
where it had been parked, uninsured and unregistered (R. 3049:4). Because another car 
had been parked behind Mr. Hatton's Accord, whoever stole it had to first push the other 
car out of the way (R. 3049:4). A few weeks later, Leisa Watkins reported that she had 
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noticed a Honda Accord being parked in front of her mailbox several times, and that the 
driver, whom she identified as defendant, would park the car and walk to a residence 
located down the street (R. 3049:4). After recovering the Accord, Mr. Hatton discovered 
that the car's steering column had been broken (R. 3049:4). A screwdriver had been used 
to start the car (R. 3049:4). 
Defendant was charged with one count of receiving or transferring a stolen motor 
vehicle, a second degree felony (R. 3049:3). He was subsequently allowed to plead guilty 
to a reduced charge of attempted receipt or transfer of a stolen vehicle, a third degree 
felony (R. 3049:24, 26-32). 
Case No. 991902830. On January 23, 1999, the vehicle defendant was driving 
was stopped on a registration violation (R. 2830:4). After impounding the vehicle, police 
found a container of methamphetamine (R. 2830:4). 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony (R. 2830:3-4). He was subsequently allowed to plead guilty to a reduced charge of 
attempted possession, a class A misdemeanor (R. 2840:19, 21-27). 
Sentencing. Defendant's sentencing hearing on these three cases and four others, 
see footnote 2 supra, was held on September 10, 1999 (R. 70:Tab 2). At that time, 
defendant stated that "[t]here are just two mistakes in the presentence report I wanted to 
point out. I guess they're not mistakes, they're just corrections. On page 10 and then on 
the last page when it's reflecting the amount of time he served" (R. 70:Tab 2:3). 
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Defendant did not challenge the accuracy of any other information contained in his 
presentence investigation report (PSI) at the time of sentencing (R. 70:Tab 2). 
Defendant's PSI indicated the following: that defendant had an extensive criminal 
history dating back to his early teens, including numerous tobacco, alcohol, and drug 
violations, as well as theft, burglary, forgery, and destruction of property (PSI Addendum 
at 9-12); that Mr. Hatton, the victim in case no. 991903049, estimated the cost of repairs 
to his Honda Accord and of replacing several missing items to be $1,500 (PSI at 8); that 
Ms. Garcia, the victim in case number 991903239, reported a loss of personal items 
valued at $500, payment of a $500 deductible on her Mustang's insurance policy, and 
payment of an additional $500 "for repair and a complete repainting of her car to make it 
all match" (PSI at 9); that Ms. Garcia's insurance company had paid $6,104.35 toward her 
vehicle's repair (PSI at 9); and that defendant was a healthy twenty-year-old who had 
been gainfully employed in the past (PSI at 13; PSI Addendum at 14, 16). 
The PSI recommended that defendant be committed to prison "and that he be 
required to pay a $625 fine, $532 surcharge, full restitution and $200 recoupment fee 
upon parole" (PSI at 14). 
Just before defendant was sentenced, the State reiterated that defendant's criminal 
history dated back to age fourteen, and that, besides abusing drugs and alcohol, defendant 
is "a forger and he's a burglar[], he's a car thief and it's a miracle he didn't kill somebody 
during the felony of evading" (R. 70:Tab 2:9). 
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Immediately following the State's comments, the trial court, although not 
specifically addressing its reasons for ordering restitution, noted: "There's no mystery 
about the fact that I'm going to obviously commit you to prison, which is probably where 
you need to be, at least until you get your head on straight. You've taken now since you 
were 14 to develop this style of living, it's going to take you a while [to] undevelop [sic] 
it" (R. 70:Tab 2:9). The court then sentenced defendant to prison and jail terms and to 
pay $9,104.35 in restitution (the total of the amounts reported by Mr. Hatton and Ms. 
Garcia) and a $250 recoupment fee to his attorney (R. 70:Tab 2:9-10). Despite the PSI's 
recommendation, the trial court did not order defendant to pay a fine or a surcharge. 
Defendant did not object to the court's order or request a restitution hearing (R. 
70:Tab 2). Final orders of his convictions and sentences were entered the same day (R. 
2830:33-34; 3049:39-40; 3239:37-38). 
Motion for Review Hearing. Eleven days later, on September 21, 1999, 
defendant filed a Motion for Review Hearing, requesting a restitution hearing pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) "on the grounds that defendant objects to the amount of 
restitution claimed by the State" (R. 2830:37; 3049:41; 3239:39). For the first time, 
defendant challenged the factual basis for restitution and requested an evidentiary hearing 
on that issue (R. 60). 
The trial court heard argument on defendant's motion on October 18, 1999, but 
took no evidence (R. 60). The trial court then clarified that the amount of restitution 
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ordered was the sum of the amounts identified in defendant's pre-sentence investigation 
report and ruled: 
Given the circumstances, the time of the sentencing, the 
persuasive burden is upon the State to establish, I believe, by 
preponderance of the evidence to myself, the fact finder, that 
the sums sought for restitution are fair and reasonable. 
Given what I have reviewed, that being the presentence 
report, as well as the orders in the matter, as well as now 
having heard arguments of counsel, I was persuaded and [am] 
now persuaded that preponderance of the evidence burden has 
been met, that the numbers I have ordered as restitution is fair 
and reasonable. Consequently the motion to modify the — I 
will characterize it as a motion to modify the order of 
restitution is denied. 
(R. 60:4-5, 7; 2830:40, 42; 3049:44-45; 3239:42, 43). A final order was entered on 
October 18, 1999 (R. 3239:43-44). Defendant timely appealed (R. 2830:44; 3049:47; 
3239:45). 
The court of appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court's restitution 
order. State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, 12 P.3d 110. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I: Utah's restitution statute provides that if a defendant objects to a trial 
court's restitution order, the trial court must provide him or her with a full restitution 
hearing at the time of sentencing. The court of appeals correctly held that, under the 
statute's plain language, a defendant must object to the restitution order at least when it is 
made to preserve his right to a full restitution hearing. Defendant's suggested 
construction—that the statute allows a defendant to request a hearing so long as he or she 
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does so "within a reasonable time" after a restitution order is entered—is both 
unsupported by the statute's plain language and impractical in application. 
Issue II. The court of appeals correctly held that the trial court's ruling on 
defendant's post-judgment motion did not revive his right to a full restitution hearing, 
where the trial court merely heard argument on the motion, without taking any evidence. 
Issue III. The court of appeals properly applied Robertson in determining that the 
trial court had considered defendant's financial condition prior to ordering restitution 
where defendant's PSI contained information concerning his ability to be gainfully 
employed, the trial court referred to defendant's PSI at sentencing, and the trial court did 
not impose a fine even though the PSI recommended one. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HELD THAT, UNDER 
UTAH'S RESTITUTION STATUTE, A DEFENDANT MUST 
OBJECT TO A RESTITUTION ORDER AT THE TIME OF 
SENTENCING TO PRESERVE HIS RIGHT TO A FULL 
RESTITUTION HEARING. 
Defendant asserts that the court of appeals' interpretation of Utah's restitution 
statute—that, to preserve his right to a full restitution hearing, a defendant must object to 
restitution at the time it is ordered—is erroneous. Pet. Br. at 23. Defendant's claim fails 
where defendant concedes the court of appeals' interpretation is consistent with the 
statute's plain language and where defendant's construction is unworkable. 
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A, The plain language of section 76-3-201 supports the court 
of appeals9 interpretation. 
This Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, f 25, 4 P.3d 795; Berube v. Fashion 
Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989) (noting "the best indication of legislative 
intent is the statute's plain language"). Thus, when faced with a question of statutory 
construction, this Court looks first to the statute's plain language. State v. Redd, 1999 UT 
108, f 11,992 P.2d 986; In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996). The Court "need 
look beyond the plain language only if [it] find[s] some ambiguity." Burns, 2000 UT 56, 
atf 25. 
Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) of the Utah Code provides: "If the defendant objects to the 
imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of 
sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(e) (1999). Interpreting this provision, the court of appeals held that "the statute is 
clear—any request for a foil restitution hearing must be made at or before sentencing." 
Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 9. 
The court's interpretation is consistent both with the statute's plain language and 
with the inferences drawn from prior case law. See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 
1029 (Utah 1996) (holding that defendant had no right to request restitution hearing on 
appeal where he failed to request a hearing or otherwise object to the restitution order at 
11 
the time he was sentenced); State v. Snyder, 141 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987) (same); State 
v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah App. 1998) (holding that trial court erred in failing to 
hold hearing where defendant "requested a restitution hearing at his sentencing"). 
In fact, defendant concedes that "strict adherence" to the statutory language 
comports with the court of appeals' construction. See Pet. Br. at 24-26.3 However, he 
then presents a nonsensical list of horrors as to why this construction cannot be 
correct—all based on the unsupported and unsupportable assumption that a trial court is 
without power to continue a sentencing hearing until a restitution hearing can be 
scheduled. Cf Pet. Br. at 25 (arguing "strict adherence would require parties to subpoena 
witnesses, collect evidence, and prepare arguments on short notice (court and parties are 
notified of recommended restitution three days before sentencing (§ 77-18-l(6)(a)), on 
the possibility that defendant may object to restitution at sentencing"); Pet. Br. at 25 
(arguing "[s]trict adherence either would require the trial court to accommodate an 
evidentiary hearing on a crowded calendar without advanced notice (an objection to 
restitution imposed at sentencing would require a full hearing at that time); or it would 
3Although he first asserts that the court's holding is erroneous because the phrase, 
"at the time of sentencing," refers to the trial court's duty, not defendant's, Aplt. Br. at 24, 
defendant does not develop this argument. More importantly, he never explains how a 
trial court can fulfill its statutory obligation to hold a restitution hearing at the time of 
sentencing if the defendant does not request one until after the sentencing hearing has 
ended. Cf State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, f 12, 992 P.2d 986 (holding court "intepret[s] a 
statute to avoid absurd consequences"); Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1292 
n.24 (Utah 1993). 
12 
require trial courts to anticipate a full hearing at every sentencing on the possibility that 
restitution may be imposed and defendant may object"); Pet. Br. at 25 (arguing "strict 
adherence would fail to accommodate due process" because "[t]he immediacy of the 
matter (three days from the date parties are notified of the recommended amounts to 
sentencing . . . ) , would not accommodate the exchange, let alone the review, of 
evidentiary materials or documents prior to the hearing, and it would not permit either the 
state or defense to consider, let alone prepare, examinations or arguments to defend or 
dispute the amount in restitution ordered at sentencing"). 
As the Weeks dissent even seems to concede, nothing prevents a trial court from 
continuing a sentencing hearing once a defendant requests a restitution hearing. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201; Weeks, 2000 UT App. 273, at f 22 n.l. Indeed, it appears that 
restitution hearings are scheduled subsequent to original sentencing dates as a matter of 
course. See e.g., State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 339, 339-40 (Utah 1985); State v. Haga, 
954 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 
App. 1997); State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Starnes, 841 
P.2d 712, 713-14 (Utah App. 1992). 
Thus, none of the hardships posited by defendant or the due process concerns he 
claims they raise are real. See Pet. Br. at 26. In sentencing, due process "require[s] that a 
defendant have the right to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the 
factual information upon which his sentence is based." State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 
13 
855 (Utah 1994). Here, the court of appeals' interpretation of section 77-3-201(4) 
provides defendant with that right; the only requirement is that he exercise it at same 
hearing in which the trial court imposes restitution. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 9. 
Due process requires nothing more. Cf. Gomez, 887 P.2d at 855 (holding due process not 
violated where defendant failed "to avail himself of the opportunity" to exercise rights 
when originally given). 
Because none of defendant's arguments support his claim that the court of appeals' 
"strict adherence" to the language of section 77-3-201 was in error, defendant's claim 
fails.4 
B. Nothing in section 76-3-201(4) reveals a legislative intent 
to override the general rule in criminal cases that a 
defendant waives any claims not timely raised. 
As noted above, defendant asserts that section 76-3-201(4) should be interpreted to 
require that a trial court provide a defendant with a full restitution hearing—even if he did 
defendant's challenge to the court of appeals' statement that a defendant may also 
request a restitution hearing before sentencing, see Pet. Br. at 24, is frivolous and, except 
in this footnote, will not be addressed further. Most obviously, nothing in the court of 
appeals' decision requires defendant to request a hearing prior to sentencing. Moreover, 
one can easily imagine cases in which a defendant will nonetheless be prepared to do so. 
Section 76-3-201(4) requires a trial court to order restitution under certain circumstances. 
If a defendant's criminal conduct fits those circumstances, he or she can anticipate that 
restitution will be an issue at sentencing. The defendant can then consult with the State 
concerning the evidence upon which restitution will be requested and review his 
presentence investigation report for any relevant information provided there. After 
reviewing this evidence, some defendants may well be prepared to request a restitution 
hearing prior to actual sentencing. 
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not request one at the time the initial restitution order was entered—so long as he requests 
one within "a reasonable time" after the restitution order was made. Pet. Br. at 28. 
However, defendant fails to explain how the language of section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) supports 
his interpretation. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that a defendant waives all claims which he 
does not timely raise. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993) 
(holding claim not raised below "is not properly preserved for appeal"); State v. Tillman, 
750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1988). Except in cases involving the legality of a sentence 
under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, this rule applies to sentencing issues 
just as it does to any others. See State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991) (holding 
that defendant waived alleged sentencing errors where he "failed to make specific 
objections to any of these alleged defects at the sentencing"); State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 
798, 801 (Utah 1990) (holding that defendant's failure to object to imposition of sentence 
when it was imposed "constitutes waiver"); Snyder, 1A1 P.2d at 421 (holding that 
defendant's failure to object to restitution order or to request restitution hearing "waived 
the right he had to challenge the order of restitution"). 
Nothing in the language of section 76-3-201 evinces a legislative intent to exclude 
restitution objections from this well-established rule. See Berube, 111 P.2d at 1038 
(noting "best indication of legislative intent is the statute's plain language"). Thus, 
defendant's construction should be rejected. 
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C. Defendant's interpretation would interject unwarranted 
uncertainty and delay into the criminal process. 
As stated above, defendant asserts that, under section 76-3-201, a trial court must 
provide him with a full restitution hearing if, despite failing to object at the time 
restitution is ordered, defendant raises an objection "within a reasonable time" after 
restitution is ordered. See Pet. Br. at 28. 
However, neither defendant nor the Weeks dissent defines what constitutes a 
"reasonable time." See Pet. Br. at 28; Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at Kf 21-23. Cf State v. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,917 (Utah 1998) (holding that prosecution commencing 28 days 
outside of 120 days required under detainer statute is "a reasonable time" where need to 
accommodate defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good cause" for delay); Renn v. 
Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 684 (Utah 1995) (noting that although relevant 
petitions "should be filed within a reasonable time after the act complained of," 
"reasonable time" requirement imposes "no fixed limitation period"); State v. Tyree, 2000 
UT App 350, ^ 15, 17 P.3d 587 (holding that sentencing hearing held over 30 days 
outside of statutory limit was "reasonable time" where delay was to accommodate 
defendant), cert, denied, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001); State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1045 
(Utah App. 1994) (noting case in which "seven weeks was reasonable time"). 
Nor does either address the factors relevant to that determination. See Pet. Br. at 
28; Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at Hf 21-23. Cf Monson v. State, 953 P.2d 73, 74 (Utah 
1998) (identifying "good cause" in post-conviction petition context to include "new facts 
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not previously known," "the existence of fundamental unfairness," and "a claim 
overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ"); State v. Peterson, 810 
P.2d 421, 426-27 (Utah 1991) (identifying "good cause" for delaying criminal trial to 
include "allowing] time for defendant and his counsel to resolve their differences," 
"unforeseen problems arising immediately prior to trial," and illness of defense counsel); 
State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 208 (Utah App. 1991) (identifying "good cause" for delaying 
criminal trial to include motions filed by defendant, "illness of the trial judge," and 
"temporary unavailability of a witness").5 
Moreover, neither addresses how such a post-judgment hearing would impact the 
appellate process. See Pet. Br. at 28; Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at Hf 21-23. Rule 4(a), 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that a defendant file a notice of appeal 
"within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. 
App. P. 4(a). Rule 4(b) provides that the only exception to this requirement in criminal 
5Even if it were possible to extract from the language of section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) 
what constitutes "a reasonable time" and the factors relevant thereto, it is unlikely that 
defendant's filing here would meet those requirements. As the court of appeals stated: 
It is clear from the record that defendant closely read the presentence report 
which contained the recommended restitution amount, which is the exact 
amount that the judge adopted when ordering restitution. Thus, prior to 
sentencing, defendant was well aware of the recommended restitution 
amount. Nothing in the record suggests that he lacked the opportunity to 
object or request a hearing before, during, or after the court imposed the 
amount. Thus, [defendant] . . had no good cause not to make the request 
[at that time]. 
Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 10. 
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cases is the filing of "a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure .. . 
under Rule 24 for a new trial." Utah R. App. P. (4)(b). There is no provision in rule 4 for 
extending the time requirement to accommodate post-judgment motions for restitution 
hearings. Utah R. App. P. (4). 
Thus, under the current rules, unless a post-judgment motion for a restitution 
hearing is filed within 10 days of the entry of judgment and thus could possibly be treated 
as a motion for new trial (which a trial court then has discretion to deny, see State v. 
Evans, 2001 UT 22,f26, 20 P.3d 888), such motion must, similar to motions to correct 
an illegal sentence filed under rule of criminal procedure 22(e), be treated as commencing 
a separate proceeding from that leading to defendant's underlying conviction and 
sentence. Under such circumstances, defendant would be required to file a notice of 
appeal within thirty days of the trial court's final judgment of conviction to preserve his 
right to challenge his conviction and other sentencing issues; and then file a separate 
notice of appeal if he wishes to challenge the trial court's ruling on his post-judgment 
restitution hearing—which, depending on the definition of "reasonable time," may not be 
issued until several months after the trial court's final judgment. See Utah R. App. P. 
4(a), (b). 
Section 76-3-201 neither requires nor supports such a convoluted process. As 
interpreted by the court of appeals, section 76-3-20 l(4)(e), consistent with due process, 
provides defendants ample opportunity to challenge a trial court's restitution order prior 
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to the court's entering a final judgment. Consistent with the plain language of the statute, 
the court's construction does not require definition of an amorphous phrase, "reasonable 
time," that does not even appear in the statute; or interject independent appeals into the 
appellate process on issues that can easily be addressed within the initial criminal 
proceeding. Cf. State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, K 12, 992 P.3d 986 (holding court 
"intepret[s] a statute to avoid absurd consequences"); Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 
P.2d 1282, 1292 n.24 (Utah 1993). 
Finally, defendant's reliance on State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977), is 
misplaced. Helm did not address the propriety of re-opening a criminal case after a final 
judgment has been entered. Rather, it addressed the propriety of delays in criminal 
proceedings that are still in progress. Specifically, Helm held that the statutory time 
period within which a trial court should sentence a defendant is not mandatory and 
jurisdictional, but is directory. As the Court explained, "[i]t requires no exposition 
thereon to demonstrate what egregious injustices might result because of some 
inadvertence, error or omission if [a defendant could go free because of the trial court's 
inability to act within the statutory time frame], especially so in cases where serious 
crimes may have been committed." Id. at 797. Because the legislature could not have 
intended such an absurd result, this Court held that "where the sentence is imposed within 
a reasonable time so that there is no abuse of the court's powers nor adverse effects upon 
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the defendant," the trial court's delay in sentencing should not be grounds for his release. 
Id. 
Here, strict adherence to the language of section 76-3-201 does not lead to an 
absurd result. The statute merely requires that, if a defendant wants the opportunity to 
challenge a restitution order at a full restitution hearing, he must request such a hearing at 
the time the restitution order is made. Defendant's ability to conform to that requirement 
is completely and solely within his control. Thus, Helm does not apply. Cf. State v. 
Tyree, 2000 UT App 350, f 20, 17 P.3d 587 (holding that Helm analysis does not apply to 
time limits placed on individual parties because a party's ability to conform to those limits 
"[is] within [the party's] own exclusive control"), cert, denied, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001). 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO TAKE EVIDENCE ON DEFENDANT'S 
POST-JUDGMENT MOTION DID NOT REVIVE HIS RIGHT TO A 
FULL RESTITUTION HEARING. 
Defendant here "did not object, question, or even mention restitution at [the time 
of] sentencing." Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 10. However, before the court of 
appeals, defendant claimed that he revived his right to a full restitution hearing by 
requesting one eleven days after the trial court had issued its final judgment. The court of 
appeals rejected defendant's argument because "c[t]he trial court did not take evidence or 
hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue, but instead simply denied the Motion to Alter or 
Amend,' and, thereby, did not waive defendant's earlier waiver of the hearing." Id. at 
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1f 12 (citation omitted). Defendant now claims that the court of appeals' ruling is contrary 
to State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712 (Utah App. 1992), State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 
(Utah 1991), and State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1991). 
A. The court of appeals9 decision does not conflict with 
Starnes. 
In State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712 (Utah App. 1992), defendant was not present at 
the hearing in which the trial court awarded restitution. After learning that defendant had 
received no notice of the hearing, the trial court granted defendant's late request for a 
restitution hearing. Starnes, 841 P.2d at 713. However, at none of the three subsequent 
restitution hearings did the trial court allow defendant to present any evidence. Id. at 714. 
The court of appeals held that, where a restitution hearing is requested by a defendant and 
granted by a trial court, the defendant "is statutorily entitled to a 'full hearing' on the 
question of restitution." Id. at 715. The court of appeals then concluded that defendant 
did not receive a "full hearing" because he was not allowed to present any evidence. Id. 
at 715-16. 
Unlike in Starnes, defendant here was present when restitution was ordered and 
could have requested a restitution hearing or otherwise challenged the trial court's 
restitution order at that time (R. 70:Tab 2). He did not do so. Under these circumstances, 
the trial court was not obligated to provide defendant with a "full" restitution hearing 
when he filed his post-judgment motion. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e); Point I, 
supra, at pp. 10-20. 
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Moreover, Starnes does not apply here because the court of appeals specifically 
concluded that the trial court's hearing on defendant's post-judgment motion was not a 
restitution hearing, but rather a hearing to consider, within the trial court's discretion, the 
legal basis for defendant's request for such a hearing. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at ^  12. 
The court of appeals' conclusion is consistent with the trial court's reference in its post-
judgment ruling to the evidence before it at "the time of the sentencing" and with that 
court's characterization of defendant's motion as "a motion to modify the order of 
restitution" (R. 60:7). 
Thus, the court of appeals' decision does not conflict with Starnes. 
B. The court of appeals9 decision also does not conflict with 
Johnson or Matsamas. 
In State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991), the defendant claimed that the 
State had failed to make the prima facie showing of corpus delicti necessary to admit her 
incriminating statements at trial. Id. at 1160. Thus, that defendant presented a legal 
issue determinable without taking any additional evidence. Although the defendant had 
not raised this issue at trial, she raised it in a motion for new trial, and the trial court 
addressed the legal question on the merits. Id. at 1161. This Court held that, by ruling on 
the merits of the issue, the trial court revived the corpus delicti issue for purposes of 
appeal. Id. 
In State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1991), the defendant claimed during 
trial that the trial court improperly admitted evidence without making the findings 
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mandated by the applicable statute. Although that defendant had not raised the issue 
before the trial court within the time frame set forth in the rules of criminal procedure, 
this Court held that the trial court revived defendant's claim by hearing argument on and 
then addressing the admissibility of the challenged evidence under the statute defendant 
had identified. Id. at 1052-53. 
Based on these cases, defendant claims that the trial court's willingness to hear 
argument on whether to consider defendant's post-judgment motion and its failure to 
mention the magic word "waiver" in denying the motion necessarily equate to the trial 
court's reaching the motion's underlying merits. Certainly, this cannot be true. Under 
such a rule, any time a trial court considers argument supporting a belated 
claim—whether on the legal memoranda submitted or, as here, after supplemental 
argument—such consideration, even if the trial court finds defendant's argument 
unpersuasive, would be sufficient to revive the claim merely because the trial court does 
not use the word "waiver." Neither Johnson or Matsamas support such a result that 
serves only to frustrate Utah's preservation and waiver rules. 
Here, the trial court set defendant's post-judgment motion for oral argument. 
However, it never took evidence, even though an evidentiary hearing would have been 
necessary to address the merits of defendant's restitution claim. Rather, the court heard 
argument from defendant as to why a restitution hearing should be granted and then 
rejected defendant's argument, and "merely clarified that the restitution amount ordered 
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was based on the presentence report." Weeks, 2000 UT App 273 at ^ 12. Because the 
trial court did not take evidence on defendant's motion, the court of appeals properly 
concluded that the trial court "did not address the issue on the merits," and thus did not 
revive defendant's right to a full restitution hearing. Id.', see also In re Estate of 
Covington, 888 P.2d 675, 678-79 & n.6 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that merely raising 
issue in post-trial motion does not preserve issue for appeal, and reading cases such as 
Johnson and Matsamas to be limited to when trial court "had the opportunity and chose to 
take evidence and fully hear the arguments raised"). 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE SPECIFIC FINDINGS 
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S FINANCIAL CONDITION BEFORE 
ORDERING RESTITUTION IS CONSISTENT WITH UTAH'S 
RESTITUTION STATUTE AND ROBERTSON. 
Defendant claims that the court of appeals erroneously upheld the trial court's 
restitution order under State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997) (Addendum C), 
because "[t]he trial court must be held to specifically noting on the record its 
consideration of the statutory factors in ordering restitution." Pet. Br. at 35. However, 
the court of appeals correctly applied Robertson by (1) first determining that the trial 
court had placed its reasons for ordering restitution on the record; and (2) then looking to 
the record as a whole to ensure that the trial court had considered the relevant statutory 
factors. 
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Section 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i) provides that "[i]f the [trial] court determines that 
restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the 
reasons for the decision a part of the court record." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i) 
(1999). Subsection (8)(c) then provides that, in determining what amount of restitution is 
appropriate, "the court shall consider . . . the financial resources of the defendant and the 
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the 
defendant." Id. § 76-3-20 l(8)(c). 
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error by failing to 
make specific findings concerning the factors listed in subsection (8)(c). The court of 
appeals rejected defendant's claim, holding that "Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(b) 
(1999) does not require findings on the record concerning each of the factors." Weeks, 
2000 UT App 273, at f 16. The court then applied Robertson to conclude that 
"'[although the court did not make findings relating to [defendant's] financial condition 
part of the record, we can reasonably assume that the court actually made such findings.'" 
Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at H 17 (quoting Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1235). 
Because Robertson addressed two different restitution orders imposed under two 
different restitution statutes, its discussion concerning a trial court's specific duty under 
section 76-3-201 may not always be clear. If, as defendant asserts, Robertson requires the 
trial court to make specific findings concerning the statutory factors that must be 
considered under section 76-3-201(8) (c), the court of appeals erred in finding no error 
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here. However, Robertson does not impose such a requirement on the trial court, 
especially when read in the context of this Court's opinions addressing similar sentencing 
statutes. 
In Robertson, this Court held that section 76-3-201(4), the general restitution 
statute, (1) requires that the reasons for ordering restitution be stated in the record, and 
(2) identifies specific financial factors which the trial court must consider before ordering 
restitution. Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234. In contrast, section 77-32a-3, which addresses 
restitution of medical costs for competency tests, requires that the reasons be on the 
record but only generally describes the financial factors which the trial court must 
consider. Id. 
Based on these provisions, the Robertson court remanded the trial court's section 
76-3-201 restitution order because "the court did not discuss on the record the reasons." 
Id. However, because the trial court had discussed its reasons for ordering section 77-
32a-3 restitution, this Court looked to the record as a whole to determine whether the 
trial court had considered defendant's financial condition before ordering that form of 
restitution. Id. at 1234-35. 
In arguing that the court of appeals' decision here conflicts with Robertson, 
defendant focuses on a statement that section 76-3-201(4) requires the trial court to 
"'explicitly not[e] on the record the reasons for the decision it reached, reflecting the 
detailed factors in the statute'" Pet. Br. at 33 (emphasis added); Robertson, 932 P.2d at 
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1234. However, the emphasized portion of the Court's statement is dicta. Remand was 
necessary under section 76-3-201 because the trial court had failed to place its reasons for 
ordering restitution on the record, as required by section 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i). Id. The 
Court's comment on the factors, then, was unessential to its holding. Moreover, strict 
application of the dicta is inconsistent with this Court's interpretation of a similar 
statute—section 76-3-401(4), providing that "[a] court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences," Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-401(4)—which this Court has never interpreted as requiring specific findings on the 
record. Cf. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998); State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 
244-45 (Utah 1995); State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 1993); State v. Strung 846 
P.2d 1297, 1301-02 (Utah 1993); State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam); State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); State v. Lee, 656 
P.2d 443, 443-44 (Utah 1982) (per curiam). 
In this case, the court of appeals found that the trial court had "stated on the record 
that restitution was appropriate based on defendant's criminal acts and his criminal 
history," Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 16. Because the trial court, as required by 
section 76-3-20l(4)(c), put its reasons for ordering restitution on the record, the court of 
appeals concluded that the trial court had fulfilled the general restitution requirement 
stated in Robertson. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at % 16. 
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The court of appeals then turned to the part of Robertson addressing restitution 
under section 77-22a-3 to determine whether the record as a whole supported the 
conclusion that the trial court had considered defendant's financial condition in ordering 
restitution here. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at U 17; Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234 (noting 
general rule that "this court upholds the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the 
record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such 
findings"). 
Here, defendant's PSI addressed both the amount of restitution owed and 
defendant's financial condition. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 17. Moreover, the trial 
court specifically referenced the PSI at sentencing. Id. Finally, the trial court declined to 
impose any fines on defendant even though the PSI requested them. Id. As in Robertson, 
the court of appeals determined on these facts that the trial court had considered 
defendant's financial circumstances in formulating its restitution order. Id. at f 17 (citing 
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234-35). 
The court of appeals' conclusion is a reasonable interpretation of Robertson and 
section 76-3-20l(8)(c). Thus, defendant's final claim also fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the State asks this Court to affirm the court of appeal's 
opinion. 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
PUNISHMENTS 76-3-201 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution 
— Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities'' means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c). * 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
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(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (l)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4)(c) and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorne/s fees. % 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution* constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (8). 
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(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. t 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5XaXi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
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the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
id) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of prdperty of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
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of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1; 
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1; 
1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 
142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 19; 
1995, ch. I l l , § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995, 
ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 1995 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch. 
79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2,3; 1998, ch. 149, 
§ 1; 1999, ch. 270, § 15. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment by ch. I l l , effective May 1, 1995, added 
aor for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement" and made a related change in Sub-
section (4)(aKi). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective 
May 1, 1995, inserted "the accrual of interest 
from the time of sentencing" in Subsection 
(l)(d), changed "person adjudged guilty" to "per-
son convicted" in Subsection i2), and added 
Subsections (4XaXiii) and (4XdXiii). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective 
May 1, 1995, added uand as further defined in 
Subsection (4XO" at the end of Subsection 
(IXd); rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the cri-
teria and procedures for ordering restitution; 
added Subsection (8); and made several stylis-
tic changes. 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective 
April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2Xg), redes-
ignated former Subsection (2Xg) as Subsection 
(2Xh), and deleted former Subsection (7Xc), 
requiring sentencing to the aggravated manda-
tory term in cases of substantial bodily injury to 
children during the commission of child kid-
napping or various listed child sexual assaults. 
The 1995 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective 
April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996* for 
"May 1, 1995" in Subsection (2Xg). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 40, effective 
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection 
(2)(g), which read: "on or after April 29,1996, to 
imprisonment at not less than five years and 
which may be for life for an offense under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Sections 76-5-301.1 
and 76-5-302; or" and redesignated former Sub-
section <2)(h) as Subsection (2)(g); deleted 
former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing 
of a defendant subject to mandatory sentencing 
under Subsection (6); and added Subsection (7). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective 
April 29, 1996, in Subsection (2Kb) substituted 
"removal or disqualification from" for "removal 
from or disqualification o r and in Subsection 
(4XaXi) added "Section" before "77-37-2." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 241, §§ 2 and 3, 
effective April 29, 1996, added Subsections 
(4)(aXvii) and (4)(dXiv). 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, 
in Subsection (4)(a)(i) substituted "Subsection 
llXe)" for "Section 77-38-2" and deleted "and 
family member has the meaning as defined in 
Section 77-37-2" from the end and changed the 
style of the internal references in Subsections 
(5)(cXi), (5)(c)(ii), and (8)(c). 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, 
in Subsection (6Xe). substituted "aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances" for "aggravation 
and mitigation" and "Sentencing Commission" 
for "Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Jus-
tice" and made stylistic changes. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 301, 
§ 6 provides that the amendments in ch. 117 to 
Subsection (4XaXiii) shall merge into this sec-
tion, as* amended by ch. 301, as Subsection 
(4XaXvf).< 
Laws 1995, ch. 337 was effective May 1,1995; 
however, § 76-3-201.3 postponed the amend-
ment of this section by ch. 337 until April 29, 
1996. 
Cross-References. — Commission on 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice, § 63-25a-101 et 
seq. 
Division of Finance, § 63A-3-101 et seq. 
Removal of officers, § 77-6-1 et seq. 
Restitution as condition of probation, § 77-
18-1. 
Sentence, judgment and commitment, Rule 
22, R.Crim.P. 
Special release from city or county jail, pur-
poses, conditions and limitations, § 77-19-3 et 
seq. 
Uniform misdemeanor fine/bail schedule, 
Code of Judicial Administration, Appx. C. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
C onstitutionality. 
Aggravating factors. 
— Bodily injury to victim. 
—Severity of offense. 
—Sufficient. 
Arrest record. 
—Effect on sentence. 
Credit for pretrial detention. 
Discretion of court. 
Effect of noncompliance. 
Informal procedure. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Lance Michael WEEKS, Defendant and Appellant. 
No 990979-CA 
Oct. 5, 2000 
Defendant pled guilty to seven charges arising out of 
several incidents, including high speed chases from 
police, stealing cars and possessing 
methamphetamine, and he was ordered to pay 
restitution The District Court, Salt Lake Department, 
J Dennis Frederick, J, denied defendant's post-
judgment motion for review heanng in which he 
requested restitution heanng Defendant appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Davis, J, held that. (1) 
defendant waived his entitlement to restitution 
heanng, (2) tnal court did not effectively waive 
defendant's waiver by holding heanng on defendant's 
post-judgment motion; (3) tnal court adequately 
stated its reasons for restitution order; and (4) record 
allowed Court of Appeals to assume that tnal court 
made appropnate findings relative to defendant's 
financial condition. 
Affirmed. 
Billings, J , dissented with opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[ 1 ] Criminal Law <®=> 1134(3) 
HOkl 134(3) 
[1] Criminal Law <®=> 1147 
110kll47 
An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's 
restitution order unless it exceeds that prescnbed by 
law or otherwise abused its discretion. 
[2] Sentencmg and Punishment <®=?2103 
350Hk2103 
Upon conviction of a crime which has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence 
imposed, the tnal court is statutonly mandated to 
order the payment of restitution unless the court finds 
that restitution is inappropnate. UC.A.1953, 
76-3-201(4). 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim 
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[3] Constitutional Law <@=>257 
92k257 
[3] Constitutional Law <@=>270(2) 
92k270(2) 
Under both the United States and the State 
Constitutions, due process requires criminal 
proceedings including sentencing to be based upon 
accurate and reasonably reliable information 
U S C A. Const.Amend. 14, Const Art 1, § 7 
[4] Sentencing and Punishment <®=>238 
350Hk238 
Fundamental principles of procedural fairness in 
sentencing require that a defendant have the nght to 
examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of 
the factual information upon which his sentence is 
based. U S C A. Const.Amend 14, Const. Art. 1, § 
7 
[5] Sentencing and Punishment <@=>240 
3$0Hk240 
Procedural fairness in sentencing is satisfied when 
defendant had a full opportunity to examine and 
challenge all factual information upon which the court 
based his sentence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14, 
Const. Art. 1, §7. 
[6] Sentencing and Punishment <®=»2201 
350Hk2201 
It is proper for the tnal court to impose restitution at 
sentencing unless defendant objects to its imposition 
and requests a full heanng on the amount at that time. 
U.C.A.1953,76-3-201(4)(e). 
[7] Sentencmg and Punishment <®=>2191 
350Hk2191 
Any request for a full restitution heanng must be 
made at or before sentencmg. UCA.1953, 
76-3-201(4)(e). 
[8] Sentencmg and Punishment <®^2201 
350Hk2201 
Defendant waived his entitlement to restitution 
heanng, where he did not object, question or even 
mention restitution at sentencmg, he was well aware 
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of recommended restitution amount prior to 
sentencing, and nothing in record suggested that 
defendant lacked opportunity to object or request 
hearing before, during or after court imposed the 
recommended restitution amount. U.C.A.1953, 
76-3-201(4)(e); Rules Cnm.Proc, Rule 12(d). 
[9] Sentencing and Punishment <§=>2201 
350Hk2201 
Trial court did not effectively waive defendant's 
waiver of his entitlement to restitution hearing by 
holding hearing on defendant's post-judgment motion 
for review hearing, in which he requested restitution 
hearing; court did not hold evidentiary hearing on 
restitution amount or reconsider the restitution 
amount on the merits, but rather merely clarified that 
restitution amount ordered was based upon 
presentence report. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-201(4)(e). 
[10] Criminal Law <@=>1134(6) 
HOkl 134(6) 
The Court of Appeals may affirm the trial court's 
ruling if it is sustainable on any legal ground even if 
different from that stated by the trial court. 
[11] Sentencing and Punishment <®=^2134 
350Hk2134 
If trial court erroneously failed to consider 
defendant's financial resources before ordering 
restitution, defendant should have immediately 
brought that error to the attention of the sentencing 
judge. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-201(8)(c). 
[12] Sentencing and Punishment <®=>2195 
350Hk2195 
In ordering restitution, trial court was not required by 
statute to make findings on the record concerning 
each of statutory factors. U.C.A.1953, 
76-3-201(8)(b). 
[13] Sentencing and Punishment <®=^2195 
350Hk2195 
Trial court adequately stated its reasons for ordering 
defendant to pay restitution, where court stated on 
record that restitution was appropriate based on 
defendant's criminal acts and his criminal history. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i). 
[14] Criminal Law <§=> 1126 
110k!126 
Record allowed Court of Appeals to assume that trial 
court made appropnate findings relative to 
defendant's financial condition before ordering 
restitution, where presentence report was part of the 
record and relied upon by trial court, and trial court 
did not impose a fine. U.C.A.1953, 76-3- 201(8)(c). 
[15] Criminal Law <S=>1181.5(8) 
110kll81.5(8) 
When a record has not been made concerning the 
reason for the amount of restitution, the appropriate 
remedy is not to vacate the order of restitution but to 
order the trial court to comply with the statute by 
giving an explanation of its decision which 
demonstrates that it has taken into account the 
appropriate statutory factors. U.C.A.1953, 
76-3-201(4)(d)(i), (8)(b). 
*112 Linda M. Jones and Scott C. Williams, Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Association, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant. 
Jan Graham, Attorney General, and Karen A. 
Kkicznik, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, P.J., and BILLINGS and 
DAVIS, JJ. 
OPINION 
DAVIS, Judge: 
K 1 Appellant Lance Michael Weeks appeals the trial 
court's denial of his post-judgment Motion For 
Review Hearing in which he requested a restitution 
hearing. We affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
K 2 Defendant pleaded guilty on July 6, 1999 to 
seven charges arising out of several incidents 
including high speed chases from the police, stealing 
cars, and possessing methamphetamine. As part of a 
plea bargain, the State dismissed several counts and 
defendant agreed to plead guilty to lesser charges. 
No promise was made as to defendant's prison time, 
but the State made clear that it would request 
consecutive terms. No mention was made of 
restitution during the plea colloquy. 
H 3 On September 10, 1999, defendant was sentenced 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
12 P 3d 110 
(Cite as: 12 P.3d 110, *112) 
Page 4 
to zero-to-five-years for each offense to be served 
concurrently The judge "further orderfed] that 
[defendant] pay restitution in the amount of 
$9,104 35, [and] that [defendant] pay a recoupment 
fee for the use of [defendant's] publicly provided 
lawyer of $250 " It is clear that defendant read the 
presentence report which set out the amount of 
damages caused by him, however, none of the 
parties, including defendant, discussed or objected to 
the restitution order during sentencmg 
f 4 Eleven days after sentencing, defendant filed a 
Motion For Review Heanng in which he requested 
that the court schedule "a Restitution [sic] hearing on 
the grounds that defendant objects to the amount of 
restitution claimed by the State " On October 18, 
1999 the review heanng (which the court called a 
"hearing incident to the defense motion for review to 
determine appropnate restitution") was held At that 
heanng, defendant's counsel stated that "there are 
amounts that were being requested that weren't 
supported by evidence in terms of damage, and that 
supposedly there was some victim reparation amount 
that [wasn't] legally applicable." The defense 
attorney continued "I don't see those in the 
presentence report. I don't know if your Honor had 
an amount that you came up with at sentencing 
because my files don't reflect the restitution." The 
court replied by referencing amounts listed in the 
presentence report. [FN1] The defense attorney 
requested further documentation as to the factual 
basis and support for those amounts. 
FN1 The presentence report listed under 
"restitution" the specific amounts of damage 
and stated that the source of information 
was the prosecutor's records, the three 
victims, and Liberty Mutual Insurance. 
U 5 The court then stated: 
Given the circumstances, the time of the 
sentencmg, the persuasive burden is upon the 
State to establish, I believe, by preponderance of 
the evidence to myself, the fact finder, that the 
sums sought for restitution are fair and 
reasonable. Given what I have reviewed, that 
bemg the presentence report, [ [FN2]] as well as 
the orders m the matter, as well as now havmg 
heard arguments of counsel, I was persuaded and 
now [am] persuaded that preponderance of the 
evidence burden has been met, that the number I 
have ordered as restitution is fair and reasonable. 
Consequently the motion to modify the~I will 
characterize it as a motion to modify the order of 
restitution is denied 
FN2 The presentence report also lists 
defendant's prior employment, the last being 
a $5 50/hour job which ended in June 1997 
As for his financial situation, the report 
states that defendant has been incarcerated 
"[a]nd therefore, has no income and no 
expenses he has no debts and no assets, 
either" 
*113 The order denying defendant's motion was 
entered on October 28, 1999, and defendant appeals 
II ANALYSIS 
% 6 Defendant makes three arguments (1) he was 
entitled to a full restitution hearing, (2) the trial court 
failed to make adequate findings pursuant to the 
statutory factors when it ordered restitution, and (3) 
there was plam error in the manner m which 
restitution was ordered 
D][2] 1 7 An appellate court will not disturb a tnal 
court's restitution order "unless it exceeds that 
prescnbed by law or otherwise abused its discretion." 
St'Mte v Schweitzer, 943 P 2d 649, 653 (Utah 
Ct App.1997). It is within the discretion of the tnal 
court to impose sentence, which may mclude a fine, 
restitution, probation or impnsonment. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) & (4) (1999); State v 
Snyder, 747 P 2d 417, 420 (Utah 1987) "However, 
upon conviction of a crime which has resulted m 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence 
imposed, the tnal court is statutonly mandated to 
order the payment of restitution unless the court finds 
that restitution is mappropnate " Snyder, 747 P 2d at 
420; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (1999) 
[3][4][5] % 8 Under both the Umted States and the 
Utah State Constitutions, due process requires 
criminal proceedings including sentencmg to be 
based upon accurate and reasonably reliable 
information. See State v Gomez, 887 P 2d 853, 854 
(Utah 1994). Thus, "[fjundamental principles of 
procedural fairness in sentencmg require that a 
defendant have the nght to examine and challenge the 
accuracy and reliability of the factual information 
upon which his sentence is based." Id at 855 
However, procedural fairness in sentencmg is 
satisfied when "[defendant had a full opportunity 
to examine and challenge all factual information upon 
which the court based his sentence " Id 
[6][7] 11 9 It is proper for the tnal court to impose 
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restitution at sentencing unless defendant objects to 
its imposition and requests a full hearing on the 
amount at that time See Utah Code Ann § 76-3-
201(4)(e) (1999), State v Staxer 706 P 2d 611, 612 
(Utah 1985) (per curiam) In this regard, Utah Code 
Ann §76-3-201(4)(e) (1999) states "If the defendant 
objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of 
sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the 
issue " Id (emphasis added) Thus, the statute is 
clear-any request for a full restitution heanng must 
be made at or before sentencing Cf Monson v 
Carver 928 P 2d 1017, 1029 (Utah 1996) (holding 
no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant 
did not object to order of restitution or request a 
heanng ), State v Haga 954 P 2d 1284, 1289 (Utah 
CtAppl998) (holding defendant entitled to full 
restitution hearing where he requested it at 
sentencing) 
[8] U 10 Defendant did not object, question, or even 
mention restitution at sentencing It is clear from the 
record that defendant closely read the presentence 
report which contained the recommended restitution 
amount, which is the exact amount that the judge 
adopted when ordering restitution. Thus, prior to 
sentencing, defendant was well aware of the 
recommended restitution amount. Nothing in the 
record suggests that he lacked the opportunity to 
object or request a hearing before, during, or after the 
court imposed that amount [FN3] Thus, because 
defendant did not request a full restitution hearing at 
or before sentencing and had no good cause not to 
make the request, he waived his entitlement to a 
restitution heanng See Utah RCnm. P 12(d) 
[FN4] 
FN3 Defendant was not depnved of the 
opportunity to cross examine witnesses or 
have a restitution heanng, instead, he 
waived that opportunity 
FN4 The dissent suggests that timely 
objection to proposed restitution and a 
request for a full heanng thereon is not as 
significant as timeliness in other areas, 
thereby leaving the time within which a 
restitution heanng could be requested 
apparently open-ended 
[9] U 11 Defendant argues that the tnal court, in 
effect, waived his waiver because he asserts the 
heanng on his motion after sentencmg amounted to a 
restitution hearing *114 In support of his position 
defendant cites to the following cases State v Seale, 
Page 5 
853 P2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993) (concluding when 
issue raised in motion for new trial for first time and 
court addressed issue on merits in denying motion 
and considered alleged error rather than finding it 
waived, defendant's right to assert issue on appeal 
was resuscitated), State v Belgard 830 P 2d 264, 
266 (Utah 1992) (holding when defendant waived 
objection to introduction of evidence but evidentiary 
hearing granted and judge considered claim, 
defendant's waiver was effectively waived by judge), 
State v Johnson 821 P 2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991) 
(concludmg when trial court addressed issue fully and 
did not rely on waiver, issue will be considered on 
appeal), State v Matsamas 808 P 2d 1048, 1053 
(Utah 1991) (same), State v Dominguez 1999 UT 
App 343, H 5, 992 P 2d 995 (holding defendant may 
appeal order stemming from full restitution hearing, 
even though motion for hearing filed ten days after 
sentencing), State v Parker 872 P 2d 1041, 1044 
(Utah Ct App 1994) (holding "trial court acted on the 
ments of motion and thus de facto considered it 
timely") 
[10] U 12 However, these cases are all 
distinguishable from this case In this case, "[t]he 
tnal court did not take evidence or hold an 
evidentiary heanng on the issue, but mstead simply 
denied the Motion to Alter or Amend," and, thereby, 
did not waive defendant's earlier waiver of the 
heanng Estate of Covington v Josephson, 888 P 2d 
675, 678 n 5 (Utah Ct App 1994) Here, 
notwithstanding the tnal court's rmscharactenzation 
of the heanng in its order, the court did not hold an 
evidentiary hearing on the restitution amount, or 
reconsider the restitution amount Instead, the court 
merely clanfied that the restitution amount ordered 
was based upon the presentence report No further 
inquiry mto the restitution amount was made, no 
evidence was taken, and the court did not address the 
issue on the ments [FN5] Thus, because the court 
did not conduct an evidentiary heanng or even 
reconsider the restitution amount on the ments, there 
was no resuscitation of defendant's earlier waiver 
[FN6] 
FN5 As in Covington, argument in support 
of defendant's motion necessarily addressing 
the ments thereof, should not be confused 
with an evidentiary hearing See Estate of 
Covington v Josephson 888 P 2d 675, 678 
n 5 (Utah Ct App 1994) 
FN6 The fact that the court did not 
specifically rely on waiver as the basis for 
denial of defendant's motion is of no 
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consequence because we may affirm the 
trial court's ruling 'if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground even [if different] from that 
stated by the tnal court ' Limb v Federated 
Milk Producers Ass'n 23 Utah 2d 222, 461 
P 2d 290, 293 n 2(1969) 
U 13 Defendant next argues that the tnal court did not 
make the appropriate findings when ordering 
restitution As for findings concerning restitution, 
Utah Code Ann § 76-3-20 l(8)(b) (1999) states "In 
determining the monetary sum and other conditions 
for complete restitution, the court shall consider all 
relevant facts, including (l) the cost of the damage or 
loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or 
destruction of property of a victim of the offense " 
In addition, the court shall consider the financial 
resources of the defendant, his ability to pay 
restitution, and the means by which he can pay See 
id § 76-3-201(8)(c) 
[11] % 14 However, defendant never challenged the 
restitution award, or the basis of the award during 
sentencing, and he did not allege unusual 
circumstances justifying his failure to do so "If the 
tnal court, as defendant alleges, erroneously failed to 
consider defendant's paltry financial resources before 
ordering [restitution], defendant should have 
immediately brought that error to the attention of the 
sentencing judge If defendant was denied relief at 
that time, he could have taken direct appeal" James 
v Galetka, 965 P2d 567, 574 (Utah CtApp 1998) 
(emphasis added), cert denied sub nom, James v 
Warden, 982 P2d 88 (Utah 1999) In addition, 
"there is ample record evidence, from which the tnal 
court could have found that restitution was proper" 
State v Stayer, 706 P 2d 611, 614 (Utah 1985) (per 
curiam) 
K 15 Defendant's final argument is that it was plain 
error for the tnal court to fail to consider the statutory 
factors when restitution was ordered. Because the 
tnal court was given the opportunity to correct the 
*115 alleged error in the context of defendant's 
motion, we will address the issue on appeal 
[12][13] % 16 There was no reversible error here 
Utah Code Ann § 76-3-20l(8)(b) (1999) does not 
require findings on the record concerning each of the 
factors Unlike statutes that require findings on the 
record, section 76-3-20l(8)(b) merely lists the factors 
which must be considered, and contains no such 
requirement Instead, Utah Code Ann § 76-3-
201(4)(d)(i) (1999) states "If the court determines 
that restitution is appropnate or inappropnate under 
this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record " Here, the 
trial court stated on the record that restitution was 
appropnate based on defendant's cnminal acts and his 
cnminal history 
[14][15] K 17 Furthermore, the tnal court relied on 
defendant's presentence report in determining 
restitution As in State v Robertson 932 P 2d 1219 
(Utah 1997), "[p]nor to the imposition of restitution 
costs at the sentencing heanng, the tnal court 
considered the information set forth in the 
presentence report" Id at 1234, see also State v 
Gomez 887 P 2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994) ("A copy of 
the presentence investigation report was provided to 
defendant pnor to [sentencing] Defendant had the 
opportunity to examine the report and challenge its 
contents and recommendations ") In Robertson the 
supreme court also considered that the tnal court 
"declined to impose any fine " Robertson 932 P 2d 
at 1234 The Robertson court stated, "[although the 
court did not make findings relating to [defendant's] 
financial condition part of the record, we can 
reasonably assume that the court actually made such 
findings " Id at 1235 [FN7] Here, the presentence 
ref ort was a part of the record and at the hearing on 
defendant's waiver, the tnal court stated that it relied 
on the report to determine the amount of restitution 
Finally, the tnal court did not impose a fine, 
therefore, based on the record, "we can reasonably 
assume that the court made such findings " Id [FN8] 
FN7 The Robertson court so held, 
notwithstanding language therein, 
apparently confusing the mandate of Utah 
Code Ann § 76-3- 201(4)(d)(i) (1997) with 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann § 76-3-
201(8)(b)(1997) 
FN8 Even if we were to conclude error 
existed, the remedy would not be a 
restitution heanng as defendant suggests 
When a record has not been made 
concerning the reason for the amount of 
restitution, the appropnate remedy 'is not to 
vacate the order of restitution' but to order 
the tnal court to comply with the statute by 
giving "an explanation of its decision which 
demonstrates that it has taken into account 
the appropnate statutory factors " Monson 
v Carver, 928 P 2d 1017, 1028 (Utah 1996) 
CONCLUSION 
K 18 By not objecting to the restitution amount and 
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requesting a hearing thereon at or prior to sentencing, 
defendant waived his right to a fall restitution 
hearing, and the trial court properly denied his 
motion Furthermore, in accordance with the effect of 
Robertson the recoid allows us to assume the court 
made appropnate findings relative to defendant's 
financial condition 
K 19 I CONCUR PAMELA T GREENWOOD, 
Presiding Judge 
BILLINGS, Judge (dissenting) 
If 20 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion 
H 21 First, I disagree that Utah Code Ann § 
76-3-201(4) requires a defendant to raise an objection 
at the sentencing hearing "The purpose of requiring 
a properly presented objection is to 'put[ ] the judge 
on notice of the asserted error and allowf ] the 
opportunity for correction at that time in the course of 
the proceeding ' " State v Brown 856 P 2d 358, 359 
(Utah Ct App 1993) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Broberg v Hess 782 P 2d 198, 201 (Utah 
Ct App 1989)) This policy is a general corollary of 
our refusal to enterlain an issue for the first time on 
appeal. The timeliness requirement of this doctrine 
prevents undue delay in litigation Accordingly, 
objection to hearsay evidence, for example, must be 
made at the time the evidence is proffered, 
otherwise, the objection is waived. 
K 22 The policy behind the timeliness requirement is 
less significant when, as here, an objection 
necessitates a separate evidentiary *116 hearing 
[FN1] Inasmuch as no objection could be raised until 
after imposition of restitution, I see no practical 
difference between an objection raised at the 
sentencing hearing and an objection raised eleven 
days later-well before the time for direct appeal has 
run 
FN1 The State concedes that, had 
Defendant presented his objection 
requesting an evidentiary hearing at his 
original sentencing hearing, the restitution 
hearing could not have taken place 
immediately because witnesses would have 
to have been subpoenaed, evidence 
gatheied, and arguments prepared 
K 23 I read the statute not as emphasizing judicial 
economy but as emphasizing due process concerns 
[FN2] This is of particular concern in this case 
Restitution was ordered on the basis of damage 
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amounts found in Defendants presentence 
investigation report [FN3] Restitution was thus 
based on undocumented double hearsay protfered by 
the victims, and Defendant was deprived of the 
opportunity to cross examine the victims as to either 
the identity or valuation of the items stolen or the 
reasonableness of the repair costs 
FN2 Indeed, if the court thinks the statute 
is concerned primarily with the timing of an 
objection, it should require that the 
objection be lodged a reasonable time 
before the sentencing hearing so that the 
trial court may 'at the time of sentencing 
allow the defendant a full hearing on the 
[restitution] issue ' Utah Code \nn § 
76-3- 20l(4)(e) (1999) (emphasis added) 
This is clearly not what the statute requires 
FN3 One victim was awarded restitution of 
S500 for unspecified personal property 
stolen from a victims car Another victim 
was awarded restitution of $1500 for a 
stolen radio, damage to the radio wiring, 
unspecified stolen personal property, and 
scratches and dents to the car, although 
repairs had not been effected and the 
amounts were estimated by the victim 
% 24 Even if section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) requires that an 
objection be raised at sentencmg, I would hold that 
the trial court waived any objection to the timeliness 
of Defendant's motion The record reveals the 
following sequence of events The trial court 
sentenced and imposed restitution on Defendant on 
September 10, 1999 On September 21, 1999, 
eleven days later, Defendant filed in the District 
Court the following "Motion for Review Hearing" 
COMES NOW the Defendant, LANCER 
MICHEL WEEKS [sic], by and through his 
counsel of record, MATTHEW G NIELSEN, 
hereby requests pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 
76-3-20l(4)(e) (1998), this Court to schedule a 
Restitution hearing on the grounds that defendant 
objects to the amount of restitution claimed by 
the State 
On September 30, 1999, the trial court issued a 
"Notice of Restitution Hearing," and that hearing was 
held on October 18, 1999 At the hearing, Defendant 
argued that amounts ordered for restitution lacked 
evidentiary support and requested documentation for 
the damages and a hearing The State argued that the 
amounts were reflected in the presentence 
investigation report and that the amounts, though 
estimates, were reasonable The trial court ruled 
from the bench 
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Given the circumstances, the time of the 
sentencing, the persuasive burden is upon the 
State to establish, I believe, by preponderance of 
the evidence to myself, the fact finder, that the 
sums sought for restitution are fair and 
reasonable 
Given what I have reviewed, that being the 
presentence report, as well as the orders in the 
matter, as well as now having heard arguments of 
counsel, I was persuaded and [am] now 
persuaded that preponderance of the evidence 
burden has been met, that die numbers I have 
ordered as restitution is fair and reasonable 
Consequently the motion to modify the--I will 
charactenze it as a motion to modify the order of 
restitution is denied 
On October 28, 1999, the court entered an "Order 
Re Restitution Hearing," which states The Court 
having heard evidence and arguments of counsel, and 
being otherwise fully advised in the premises hereby 
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
ongmal order m the Judgment and Commitment m 
this case is the proper amount to be ordered as 
restitution and hereby affirms that order and denies 
defendant's motion 
(Emphasis added) 
H 25 I believe the foregoing establishes the trial court 
did not rely on waiver but instead *117 addressed the 
ments of Defendant's motion objecting to the amount 
of restitution Defendant requested a "review 
hearing", the court scheduled a "restitution hearing", 
the parties argued the validity of the evidentiary basis 
of the restitution award, and the court ruled 
Defendant argues on appeal that the court erred by 
reconsidering the order of restitution without giving 
Defendant the required evidentiary hearing providing 
an opportunity to present evidence and cross examine 
witnesses See Utah Code Ann § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) 
(1999) [FN4] Because the trial court did not provide 
Defendant an evidentiary hearing, I would vacate the 
restitution order and remand for an evidentiary 
hearing on the amount of restitution. 
FN4 Section 76-3-201 (4)(e) provides "If 
the Defendant objects to the imposition, 
amount, or distribution of the restitution, the 
court shall at the time of sentencing allow 
the defendant a full hearing on the issue" 
K 26 I also disagree with the majority's conclusion 
that we need not remand for findings related to 
Defendant's ability to pay the restitution assessed See 
id The majority cites this court's opinion in James v 
Galetka, 965 P 2d 567, 574 (Utah Ct App 1998) for 
the proposition that remand is not required Galetka 
is clearly distinguishable in that it involved a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus filed three years after the 
defendant's conviction, see id at 569, and the 
defendant neither challenged the restitution during 
sentencing nor appealed it See id at 574 Galetka 
was decided under the well-established rule that 
courts will not consider an issue on a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus that could have been addressed at 
trial or on direct appeal See id (citing Codianna v 
Moms 660 P 2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983)) Dicta in 
Galetka concerning the timing requirement of an 
objection to restitution is neither binding nor, in my 
opinion, persuasive 
K 27 Additionally, the majority quotes selectively 
from State v Stayer 706 P 2d 611 (Utah 1985), for 
the proposition that we may assume the trial court 
considered all appropriate factors if evidence in the 
record supports the trial court's conclusion 
However, the full quote from Stayer reads In the case 
before us, there is ample record evidence, from which 
the trial court could have found that restitution was 
proper Notwithstanding the mandate of the statute 
th t^ the trial court's reasons be included as part of its 
order, we believe that the failure to do so in this case 
was harmless error Nonetheless, we draw attention 
to this requirement for future guidance of the 
sentencing courts 
Id at 614 (emphasis added) 
H 28 Subsequent cases from our supreme court make 
clear that record findings under section 76-3-201 are 
mandatory so that we may no longer assume that the 
trial court considered the enumerated factors See 
State v Robertson, 932 P 2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997) 
(holding section 76-3-201 is exception to general rule 
that appellate courts "uphold[ ] the trial court even if 
it failed to make findings on the record whenever it 
would be reasonable to assume that the court actually 
made such findings"), Monson v Carver 928 P 2d 
1017, 1028-29 (Utah 1996) (remanding for 
explanation of statutory factors in restitution order 
although defendant did not object to order) 
% 29 Accordingly, although the trial court discussed 
some of the statutory factors on the record, the court 
did not explain on the record its evaluation of 
Defendant's ability to pay Under Robertson and 
Monson, we cannot assume, as the majority does, that 
the trial court considered factors it did not discuss on 
the record 
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1^ 30 Finally, I wish to clarify potentially confusing 
dicta in footnote three of the majonty opinion That 
section of the majonty opinion purports to address 
whether the tnal court committed plain error by not 
granting an evidentiary hearing Defendant's actual 
argument, and the issue the majonty actually 
addresses is whether the tnal court committed plain 
error by not considenng the statutorily mandated 
factors when evaluaiing restitution Although I agree 
that remand for an evidentiary hearing for the latter 
would not be required, see Monson 928 P 2d at 1028 
(Utah 1996), [FN5] remand for an evidentiary *118 
hearmg is clearly the remedy if the error was in 
failing to hold a requested evidentiary heanng See 
State v Haga 954 P 2d 1284, 1289 (Utah 
CtApp 1998) 
FN5 The Monson court remanded the 
matter to the Board of Pardons and Parole 
with instructions to comply with the 
[restitution] statute by giving [defendant] an 
explanation of its decision which 
demonstrates that it has taken into account 
the appropriate statutory factors Monson 
928 P2d at 1028 The court did not 
remand for an evidentiary heanng because it 
held that Monson had not requested a 
hearing from the board, but only made that 
request in a subsequent habeas corpus 
petition to the distnct court See id at 
1029 
U 31 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the 
majority opinion 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Supreme Court of Utah 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Jerry Lee ROBERTSON, Defendant and Appellant 
No 940374 
Feb 18,1997 
Defendant was convicted in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake Division I, Michael Murphy, J , of murder 
and theft Defendant appealed The Supreme Court, 
Zimmerman C J , held that (1) evidence supported 
determination, upon filing of competency petition, 
that defendant was malingering, (2) trial court's 
failure to enter formal stay dunng rwo-week period in 
which competency petition was pending was harmless 
error, (3) marital testimonial privilege did not 
preclude testimony by defendant's former wife, (4) 
marital communication privilege did not preclude 
testimony by former wife, (5) former's wife's 
testimony that "everybody knew what would happen 
should he act crazy" did not depnve defendant of fair 
trial, (6) trial court's refusal to give proposed 
reasonable doubt instructions was not reversible 
error, and (7) imposition of restitution for extradition 
costs required discussion, on record, of reasons 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded 
Steward, Associate C J , dissented and filed opinion 
in which Durham, J , concurred 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law <£=>735 
110k735 
Determination of whether defendant is competent to 
proceed to trial is mixed question of fact and law 
[2] Criminal Law <@=>734 
110k734 
Proper interpretation of statutory standard for 
competency to stand trial is question of law 
[3] Criminal Law <§=> 1130(2) 
HOkl 130(2) 
Defendant who claimed incompetency to stand trial 
bore burden, on appeal, of marshaling all evidence in 
favor of factual finding that he was malingering and 
then demonstrating that, even viewing evidence in 
light most favorable to court below, that evidence was 
insufficient to support court's finding 
[4] Criminal Law <®= 6^25 15 
110k625 15 
Trial court's determination, upon filing of petition 
pertaining to defendant's competency to stand trial, 
that defendant was malingering was supported by 
evidence that defendant laughed and joked during 
extradition trip, exhibiting no signs of speaking 
difficulties, that defendant showed markedly different 
speaking ability depending on whether he was being 
formally observed or merely dealing with staff at state 
hospital, and that results of three intelligence quotient 
(IQ) tests for defendant varied dramatically, with 
reason attributed to defendant's uncooperative and 
faking behavior U C A 1953, 77-15-1, 77-15-2 
[5] Criminal Law <£=> 1144 1 
110kll44 1 
[5J Criminal Law <®=* 1158(1) 
110kll58(l) 
When factual issues are presented to and must be 
resolved by trial court, but no findings of fact appear 
in record, Supreme Court assumes that trier of fact 
found them in accord with its decision, and Court 
affirms decision if from evidence it would be 
reasonable to find facts to support it 
[6] Criminal Law <@=*737(1) 
110k737(l) 
If governing statute explicitly provides that trial court 
must make written findings of fact regarding 
particular matter, then court's failure to make these 
findings may constitute error, even if it would be 
reasonable to conclude that judge intended to make 
them 
[7] Criminal Law <§=> 1144 1 
110kll44 1 
If Supreme Court has previously determined that trial 
court must make written findings on issue to assure 
that materiality of question is impressed on trial judge 
so as to enable Court to perform properly its appellate 
review function, then Court will not assume that trial 
court made findings 
Copr © West 2001 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
932 P 2d 1219 
(Cite as: 932 P.2d 1219) 
[8] Criminal Law <£=> 1166( 12) 
HOkl 166(12) 
Trial court's failure to enter explicit finding, in 
relation to competency petition, that defendant was 
competent to stand trial did not constitute reversible 
error, given that no explicit legislative directive 
existed to make written findings with regard to issue, 
that court explicitly considered and rejected all of 
defendant's contentions that he was incompetent to 
proceed, and that record was entirely consistent with 
finding of competency U C A 1953, 77-15-2 
[9] Criminal Law <§==> 1144 1 
110kll44 1 
If appellant fails to provide adequate record on 
appeal, Supreme Court must assume regularity of 
proceedings below 
[ 10] Criminal Law <§=> 1162 
110kll62 
Erroneous decision by trial court cannot result in 
reversible error unless error is harmful. 
[ 11 ] Criminal Law <S=> 1162 
110kll62 
"Harmless error" is error that is sufficiently 
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood 
that it affected outcome of proceedings. 
[ 12] Criminal Law <®=> 1163( 1) 
110kll63(l) 
Burden of showing harmfiilness from trial court error 
normally rests with complaining party. 
[13] Criminal Law <3=>1166(12) 
HOkl 166(12) 
Trial court's failure to enter formal stay during two-
week penod in which petition pertaining to 
defendant's competency to stand trial was pending 
was harmless error, where defendant was in fact 
competent to stand trial. UC.A.1953, 77-15-5(6) 
(1993). 
[14] Witnesses <§=>52(1) 
410k52(l) 
Marital testimonial privilege permits husband or wife 
to refuse to testify in court about any matter against 
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spouse Const Art 1, § 12, Rules of Evid, ^ale 
502(a) 
[15] Statutes <®^ 188 
361kl88 
[15] Statutes <@=* 190 
361kl90 
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, 
Supreme Court will not look beyond it to divine 
legislative intent, instead, Court is guided by rule that 
statute should be construed according to its plain 
language 
[16] Witnesses <®==>75 
410k75 
Marital testimonial privilege is to be invoked, if at all, 
only by spouse whom state seeks to compel to testify 
Const Art. 1, § 12, Rules of Evid., Rule 502(a). 
[17] Witnesses <®=>64(1) 
410k64(l) 
Mental testimonial privilege did not preclude 
testimony by defendant's former wife who was not 
compelled to testify. Const. Art. 1, § 12, Rules of 
Evid., Rule 502(a). 
[18] Statutes <@=>211 
361k211 
Supreme Court may look to title of legislation to 
clarify meaning of ambiguous statutory language, but 
title cannot be used to contradict or defeat plainly 
expressed intent or to create ambiguity or uncertainty 
when language of body of act is clear. 
[19] Witnesses <§=> 195 
410kl95 
[19] Witnesses <@=>217 
410k217 
Marital communication privilege may be asserted by 
either spouse, even following dissolution of marriage 
UCA.1953, 78-24-8(1); Rules of Evid, Rule 
502(b). 
[20] Witnesses <3=> 190 
410kl90 
Marital communication privilege did not prohibit 
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defendant's former wife from testifying about 
defendant's marital statements which were made in 
course of plan to commit or commission of crime. 
UCA1953, 78-24-8(1), Rules of Evid, Rule 
502(b)(4)(B) 
[21] Courts <@=>85(1) 
106k85(l) 
Rules of evidence and procedure promulgated by 
Supreme Court under its constitutional power operate 
to supersede inconsistent statutory provisions. 
[22] Criminal Law <§=* 1155 
1lOkl155 
Supreme Court will not reverse trial court's denial of 
motion for mistrial absent abuse of discretion. 
[23] Criminal Law <@=>867 
110k867 
When deciding motion for mistrial, trial court must 
determine whether incident may have or probably 
influenced jury, to the prejudice of defendant; if in 
exercising its discretion, court concludes that incident 
probably did not prejudice jury, court should deny 
motion. 
[24] Criminal Law <@=> 1155 
HOkllSS 
Unless review of record shows that trial court's 
decision denying motion for mistrial is plainly wrong 
in that disputed incident so likely influenced jury that 
defendant cannot be said to have had fair trial, 
Supreme Court will not find that court's decision was 
abuse of discretion. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6; 
Const. Art. 1, § 12. 
[25] Criminal Law <§=>867 
110k867 
Testimony by defendant's former wife that 
"everybody knew what would happen should he act 
crazy" and prosecutor's subsequent admonishment to 
wife that proceedings had been "sanitized" did not 
depnve defendant of fair trial, even though defendant 
claimed incompetency to stand trial and comments 
could have implied that defendant had feigned mental 
illness to avoid prosecution, where trial court struck 
wife's statement and instructed jury to disregard it, 
and court determined that prosecutor's comment was 
not heard by jury. U S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6; Const. 
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Art 1,§ 12 
[26] Criminal Law <@=>769 
110k769 
Trial court has duty to instruct jury on law applicable 
to facts of the case 
[27] Criminal Law <§=>770(1) 
110k770(l) 
Defendant has nght to have his theory of case 
presented to jury in clear and comprehensible 
manner 
[28] Criminal Law <£=> 1134(3) 
HOkl 134(3) 
Whether trial court's refusal to give proposed jury 
instruction constitutes error is question of law, which 
Supreme Court may review for correctness. 
[29] Criminal Law <®=>829(1) 
110k829(l) 
It ip not error to refuse proposed instruction if point is 
properly covered in other instructions. 
[30] Criminal Law <®=>822(1) 
110k822(l) 
Supreme Court reviews jury instructions in their 
entirety and will affirm when instructions taken as 
whole fairly instruct jury on law applicable to case. 
[31] Criminal Law <®=>789(4) 
110k789(4) 
Standard for reviewmg appropriateness of reasonable 
doubt instruction involves three-part test, instruction 
should specifically state that state's proof must 
obviate all reasonable doubt, instruction should not 
state that reasonable doubt is one which would 
govern or control person in the more weighty affairs 
of life, and instruction should not instruct that 
reasonable doubt is not merely possibility, although it 
is permissible to instruct that fanciful or wholly 
speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
[32] Criminal Law <@=>829(18) 
110k829(18) 
Trial court's refusal to give proposed reasonable 
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doubt instructions, both of which included instruction 
on theory of reasonable alternative hypothesis, did 
not constitute reversible error, where instruction 
given was appropriate statement of law, instruction 
which was given contained clear and unambiguous 
statement that State's proof had to obviate all 
reasonable doubt instruction did not define 
reasonable doubt in terms of the "more weighty 
decisions in life," and instruction articulated 
appropriate definition of reasonable doubt 
[33] Sentencing and Punishment <@=>2103 
350Hk2103 
(Formerly 110kl208 4(2)) 
Imposition of restitution is matter left to discretion of 
court 
[34] Extradition and Detainers <S=^40 
166k40 
Imposition of restitution for extradition costs required 
discussion, on record, of reasons U CA 1953, 
76-3-201(4)(b)(i), <4)(c)(i), (4)(d)(i), 77-32a- 1, 
77-32a-3 
[35] Criminal Law <@=>1166(1) 
HOkl 166(1) 
Imposing restitution of costs incurred to house 
defendant in state hospital during his penod of 
malingering, without specifically stating that 
defendant's financial condition was considered, was 
not reversible error, where trial court's actions at 
sentencing hearing indicated that court considered 
defendant's financial resources UCA1953, 
76-3-201(4)(c)(i), 77-15- 9(4), 77-32a-3 
*1221 Jan Graham, Att'y Gen, Marian Decker, Asst 
Att'y Gen, Howard Lemke, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff 
*1222 Mary C Corporon, Kelhe F Williams, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant. 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
Jerry Lee Robertson appeals his 1994 jury conviction 
for murder and theft and the trial court's subsequent 
imposition of restitution costs totaling approximately 
$60,000 Robertson claims that the trial court made 
numerous errors during his trial, including (l) finding 
him competent to proceed to trial without making 
adequate findings of fact, (n) failing to hold a 
hearing on the issue of competency, (in) failing to 
stay all proceedings against him subsequent to the 
filing of a petition for inquiry into competency (iv) 
admitting his former wife's testimony against him 
(v) failing to grant a mistrial following allegedly 
prejudicial statements made in the jury's presence, 
(vt) failing to give the jury his proposed reasonable 
doubt instruction and failing to instruct the jury on the 
theory of reasonable alternative hypothesis, and (vn) 
abusing its discretion in ordering restitution costs 
We have jurisdiction to hear Robertson's claims 
because this case is an appeal from a "district court 
involving a conviction of a first degree felony" 
Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2(3)(i) We affirm the 
conviction but remand for further proceedings 
regarding restitution of extradition costs 
In late October of 1991, Robertson and his wife, 
Cassie, were living on the streets in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, when they met Gerald Thomas at the Salvation 
Army Thomas offered to let Robertson and Cassie 
stay with him m his apartment for a few days They 
stayed with Thomas for approximately five days On 
the last day, Robertson and Thomas began to argue 
While Thomas was in the bathroom, Robertson told 
Cassie that he was going to "take him out" After 
Thpmas went to bed, Robertson told Cassie to knock 
Thomas out by hitting him in the head with a 
hammer Cassie located a claw hammer in Thomas's 
apartment while Robertson went through Thomas's 
wallet While Thomas slept, Cassie struck Thomas 
once in the left side of his head with the hammer 
Thomas immediately sat up and exclaimed, "Oh 
God1" Robertson took the hammer from Cassie and 
struck Thomas in the head approximately eleven 
times Thomas died as a result of the hammer blows 
to his head 
Both Robertson and Cassie were apprehended in 
Fresno, California, for Thomas's murder They were 
subsequently extradited to Utah Cassie, who 
pleaded guilty to murder, was serving a five-to-hfe 
prison term at the time of Robertson's trial 
Robertson and Cassie were divorced on September 
14, 1992 
On June 8, 1992, Robertson filed a competency 
petition claiming that he was not competent to stand 
trial The trial court appointed Drs Linda Gummow 
and Vickie Gregory to examine Robertson Both 
examiners concluded that Robertson was incompetent 
to stand trial The State stipulated to the examiners' 
findings, and the trial court committed Robertson to 
the Utah State Hospital on June 26, 1992 The court 
ordered the State Hospital to provide documentation 
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regarding Robertson's progress toward competency 
On April 23, 1993, a State Hospital administrator 
sent a letter to the trial court indicating that Robertson 
was competent to stand trial The court had also 
received reports from State Hospital doctors 
indicating that Robertson was malingering Pursuant 
to this information, the State moved to have 
Robertson transported from the State Hospital to the 
county jail to await further proceedmgs. 
The trial court held several evidentiary hearings on 
the issue of Robertson's malingering After 
considering the evidence, the court determined that 
Robertson was "feigning" his symptoms The 
commitment order was vacated Having vacated the 
commitment order, the court determined that a "state 
of equipoise" then existed regarding Robertson's 
competence to proceed The court then proceeded 
"as i f the commitment order "had never been 
forthcoming" Robertson had the nght and 
opportunity to raise the issue of competency again, 
but the court noted that he had the burden of proof. 
Represented by new counsel, Robertson filed a 
second competency petition on March 3, 1994 The 
tnal court denied the petition, finding that Robertson's 
promise of future cooperation with mental health 
experts was *1223 not credible The court did, 
however, permit a further mental evaluation to be 
conducted, on condition that the evaluation not delay 
the tnal and that the parties stipulate to the evaluator 
The parties stipulated to the appointment of Dr Louis 
Moench. Dr Moench examined Robertson and 
concluded that he was feigning incompetency. 
On another front, Robertson made a pretrial motion 
to exclude from the forthcoming tnal all testmiony of 
his former wife, Cassie The court denied 
Robertson's motion. During tnal, Cassie made a 
statement that could be construed as referring to 
Robertson's "acting" crazy. Robertson moved for a 
new tnal, arguing that the statements had tainted the 
jury The tnal court concluded that the ambiguous 
remark did not taint the jury and denied the motion. 
Following a four-day tnal, Robertson was convicted 
of murder and theft. The court imposed a term of 
five years to life for murder and one to fifteen years 
for theft Additionally, the court miposed 
approximately $60,000 m restitution costs on 
Robertson to cover the expenses mcident to 
extradition and housmg Robertson at the State 
Hospital during his penod of malingering. 
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Robertson claims that the trial court erred by (I) 
finding him competent to proceed to trial without 
making adequate findings of fact, (u) failing to hold 
a hearing on the issue of competency, (in) failing to 
stay all proceedmgs against him subsequent to the 
filing of a petition for inquiry into competency, (IV) 
admitting his former wife's testimony against him, 
(v) failing to grant a mistnal following allegedly 
prejudicial statements made in the jury's presence, 
(vi) failing to give the jury his proposed reasonable 
doubt instruction and failing to instruct the jury on the 
theory of reasonable alternative hypothesis, and (vn) 
abusing its discretion in ordenng restitution costs 
We will address these claims seriatim 
Regarding the handling of his petition for inquiry 
into his competency, Robertson raises three claims of 
error His three claims can be addressed under two 
headmgs first, that the tnal court erced substantively 
when it concluded that he was competent and, second, 
that the court failed to follow the correct procedures 
in that it did not hold a proper heanng on the issue of 
competency and it refused to stay all proceedings 
against him subsequent to the filing of his petition. 
On the ments of the competency issue, under section 
77-15-2 of the Code, [FN1] the tnal court must 
determine whether an accused has the ability to 
understand the nature of the proceedmgs and the 
potential punishment and has the ability to assist 
counsel in his or her defense [FN2] Robertson 
essentially argues that the court arbitranly rejected 
the analyses and conclusions of the two court-
appointed examiners who testified that he was 
incompetent in favor of the other witnesses who 
claimed he was feigning. 
FN 1 Section 77-15-2 of the Code states 
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is 
incompetent to proceed if he is suffering 
from a mental disorder or mental retardation 
resulting either in 
(1) his inability to have a rational and 
factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him or of the punishment specified 
for the offense charged, or (2) his inability 
to consult with his counsel and to 
participate in the proceedings against him 
with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding 
FN2 This determination is mandated by 
section 77-15-1 of the Code, which 
provides, "No person who is incompetent to 
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proceed shall be tried or punished for a 
public offense" 
[1][2][3] The determination of whether a defendant 
is competent to proceed to trial is a mixed question of 
fact and law State v Lafferty, 749 P 2d 1239, 1243 
(Utah 1988) The trial court's factual findings in 
support of its determination of malingering and its 
accompanying credibility determinations are subject 
to a clearly erroneous standard of review. Utah 
RCivP 52(a), Lafferty, 749 P 2d at 1244. The 
proper interpretation of the statutory standard for 
competency is a question of law. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
at 1243 Before this court, Robertson essentially 
challenges the trial court's findings of fact. 
Therefore, Robertson bears the burden of marshaling 
all the evidence in favor of the factual finding that he 
was malingering and then demonstrating that, even 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the *1224 court below, that evidence is insufficient to 
support the court's findmg Saunders v Sharp, 806 
P 2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) (per curiam). 
The court-appointed doctors who performed the 
competency evaluations on Robertson acknowledged 
that patient cooperation was very important in 
diagnosing competency and that without cooperation 
any test result was questionable. Dr. Gummow 
stated that the tests she administered required 
Robertson's complete honesty and that she would not 
have picked up on a consistent he from Robertson. 
In fact, Dr. Gummow conceded that Robertson's 
reluctance to talk about the murder could be 
attributed to choice rather than to inability. Dr. 
Gregory also acknowledged that the validity of all 
testing hinged on Robertson's honesty and that there 
was a possibility that he had not been entirely honest 
with her. Thus, by their own testimony, if Robertson 
had been consistently dishonest with Drs. Gummow 
and Gregory, their determination that Robertson was 
incompetent is unreliable. 
[4] The record reveals ample evidence supporting the 
trial court's determination of malingering. One of the 
primary symptoms of mental incompetency relied 
upon by Drs. Gregory and Gummow was Robertson's 
inability to express or understand verbal 
communications. The record is replete with evidence 
of faking on this pomt. The Salt Lake City Police 
Department detective who escorted Robertson from 
Fresno, California, to Salt Lake City testified that 
Robertson laughed and joked during the trip, 
exhibiting no signs of speaking difficulties. 
Likewise, a registered nurse at the State Hospital 
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testified that Robertson showed markedly different 
speaking ability, depending upon whether he was 
being formally observed or merely dealing with staff 
A clinical worker from the State Hospital made 
similar observations Indeed, this clinical worker 
overheard Robertson talking on the phone with his 
lawyers using monosyllabic responses and a dragging 
speech pattern, only to revert back to a livelier speech 
pattern when the call ended. The clinical worker 
testified that when she confronted Robertson, he 
responded by stating that his lawyers "knew that this 
was an act." 
The trial court also heard evidence from other 
doctors who had observed Robertson Dr Bert 
Cundick evaluated Robertson with multiple I Q tests 
Robertson's results on these tests varied dramatically 
Dr Cundick attributed this discrepancy to 
Robertson's uncooperative and faking behavior Dr 
Cundick therefore concluded that Robertson was 
malingering and was competent to stand trial 
Additionally, Drs Gerald Berge, Robert Howell, and 
Anthony Gillette all testified to observing behavior 
that led them to conclude that Robertson was feigning 
incompetency. Finally, on the basis of its own 
observations and Robertson's responses to rn-court 
questioning, the trial court found that Robertson had 
malingered and would contmue to feign 
incompetency. From the foregoing, we cannot 
conclude that the trial court's determination that 
Robertson was feigning incompetency was clearly 
erroneous. 
The court did not, however, enter a finding that 
Robertson was competent. Robertson asserts that this 
omission necessitates a reversal of his conviction 
Robertson argues that section 77-15-2 of the Code, 
which defines the legal standard of competency, 
requires the court to enter specific findings regarding 
whether he is competent. We reject this argument. 
[5][6][7] Under our decision m State v Ramirez, 
when "factual issues are presented to and must be 
resolved by the trial court but no findings of fact 
appear in the record, we 'assume that the trier of [the] 
facts found them in accord with its decision, and we 
affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be 
reasonable to find facts to support it.' "817 P.2d 774, 
787 (Utah 1991) (quoting Mower v McCarthy, 122 
Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224, 226 (1952)) (additional 
citations omitted). However, there are mstances in 
which the application of the Ramirez assumption 
would be inappropriate. For instance, in Ramirez 
itself we said, "If the ambiguity of the facts makes 
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this assumption unreasonable, we will remand for a 
new trial" Id at 788 (citations omitted) In addition, 
if a governing statute explicitly provides that the trial 
court must make written findings of fact *1225 
regarding a particular matter, then the court's failure 
to make these findings may constitute error, even if it 
would be reasonable to conclude that the judge 
intended to make them State v Labrum 925 P 2d 
937 939-40 (Utah 1996) Moreover, if this court has 
previously determined that the tnal court must make 
written findings on an issue to assure that the 
materiality of the question is impressed on the tnal 
judge so as to enable this court to perform properly 
its appellate review function, then we will not assume 
that the court made the findings See e g State v 
Eldredge 773 P 2d 29, 34 (Utah) (requmng trial 
court to enter findings and conclusions regarding 
admission of hearsay testimony of child victims m sex 
abuse cases), cert denied sub nom Eldredge v Utah 
493 US 814, 110 SCt 62, 107 L Ed 2d 29 (1989), 
State v Nelson 725 P 2d 1353, 1355-56 n 3 (Utah 
1986) (same) We do not face any of these situations 
here 
The sections relied upon by Robertson m support of 
his argument that the court erred by failing to make 
findings regardmg his competency do not contain an 
explicit legislative directive to make wntten findings 
Section 77-15-2 of the Code merely defines 
incompetency in simple terms, it makes no reference 
whatsoever to a duty of the tnal court to make any 
wntten findings on the issue Section 77-15-6 [FN3] 
provides the procedures to be followed if a defendant 
is found incompetent Section 77-15-6( 1) states 
FN3 This section was amended in 1994, 
effective May 2, 1994 Incompetent 
Defendants Amendments, ch 162, § 5, 1994 
Utah Laws 728-30 This amendment 
substantially rewrote the procedures to be 
followed after a defendant has been found 
incompetent The current version of 
section 77- 15-6 provides m pertinent part 
(4) [T]he court shall hold a heanng to 
determine the defendant's current status 
At the heanng, the burden of proving that 
the defendant is competent is on the 
proponent of competency Following the 
hearing, the court shall determine by a 
preponderance of evidence whether the 
defendant is 
(a) competent to stand tnal, 
(5) (a) If the court enters a finding pursuant 
to Subsection (4)(a), the court shall proceed 
with the tnal or such other procedures as 
may be necessary to adjudicate the charges 
All subsequent citations are to section 
77-15-6 as it stood prior to the 1994 
amendment 
[I]f after hearing, the person is found to be 
incompetent, the court shall order him committed 
to the Utah State Hospital or to another mental 
health facility until the court that committed him 
or the distnet court of the county where he is 
confined, after notice and hearing, finds that he is 
competent to proceed 
This section likewise does not require the trial court 
to make specific wntten findmgs of fact The 
statutes relied upon by Robertson, thus, unlike the 
statute in Labrum do not require written findings 
concerning the vanous definitional aspects of 
incompetency found in section 77-15-2 Furthermore 
no prior case has mandated that a tnal court make 
wntten findmgs on this issue Therefore, we now 
proceed to determine whether the facts of this case 
support the Ramirez assumption that the tnal court 
found that Robertson was competent 
The tnal court explicitly determined that Robertson 
was feigning incapacity to comprehend and 
communicate Because Drs Gummow and Gregory 
had found Robertson incompetent on the basis of his 
inability to comprehend and communicate, the court 
determined that their findmgs of incompetency were 
m ereor The court therefore vacated its commitment 
order, which had been based solely on their 
evaluations of Robertson When Robertson agam 
raised the issue of competency, the tnal court demed 
his petition, which did not allege any facts of 
incompetency that the court had not already 
determined to be a product of Robertson's feigning 
Having found that Robertson's claim of incompetency 
was not credible, the court proceeded with the trial 
Implicit m the court's decision to proceed with the 
tnal after it determined that Robertson was merely 
feigning his "symptoms" of incompetency is a 
determination that Robertson was competent 
Indeed, that the court actually made this implicit 
finding of competency is strongly supported by the 
court's comments on the jury's verdict at the 
sentencmg heanng The court stated that "because of 
the alternatives that [the jury] rejected m terms of 
guilty and mentally ill, their view is consistent with 
my view and that is, that *1226 the defendant was 
competent to proceed " (emphasis added) 
[8] Here, the tnal court explicitly considered and 
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rejected all of Robertson's contentions that he was 
incompetent to proceed, and because the record is 
entirely consistent with a finding of competency, we 
can safely apply the Ramirez assumption and 
conclude that the court found Robertson competent 
We therefore uphold the trial court's decision to 
proceed with the trial 
Robertson next claims that the trial court failed to 
follow the correct procedures m dealing with his 
second competency petition. Specifically, Robertson 
argues first that the trial court did not hold the hearing 
required by section 77-15-5(1) of the Code and 
second that it did noi stay all proceedings pending the 
disposition of the petition, as required by section 
77-15-5(6) [FN4] Section 77-15-5(1) provides, 
"When a petition is filed pursuant to Section 77-15-3, 
the court shall enter an order for a hearing on the 
mental condition of the person who is the subject of 
the petition" Section 77-15-5(6) states, "All other 
proceedings pending against the defendant shall be 
stayed until the proceedings to determine his mental 
condition are terminated." 
FN4 Robertson's arguments concerning the 
trial court's failure to hold a hearing or stay 
the proceedings are based on the current 
version of section 77-15-5 This section, 
however, was amended in 1994, and the 
amendment became effective May 2, 1994 
Incompetent Defendants Amendments ch. 
162, § 4, 1994 Utah Laws 726-28 This 
amendment modified the provisions dealing 
with the hearing and stay requirements 
Section 77- 15-5 now provides in relevant 
part 
(1) When a petition is filed pursuant to 
Section 77-15-3 raising the issue of the 
defendant's competency to stand trial , the 
court in which proceedings are pending 
shall i>tay all proceedings The district 
court in which the petition is filed shall pass 
upon the sufficiency of the allegations of 
incompetency If a petition is opposed by 
either party, the court shall, prior to 
granting or denying the petition, hold a 
limited hearing solely for the purpose of 
determining the sufficiency of the petition 
If the court finds that the allegations of 
incompetency raise a bona fide doubt as to 
the defendant's competency to stand trial, it 
shall enter an order for a hearing on the 
mental condition of the person who is the 
subject of the petition 
Utah Code Ann § 77-15-5 (emphasis 
added) As this version did not become 
effective until after the trial court's 
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dismissal of Robertson s second petition on 
March 17, 1994, our analysis and all 
subsequent citations are to section 77-15-5 
as it stood prior to the 1994 amendment 
[9] Responding to the first argument, we note that 
section 77-15-5(1) directs that if a petition asserting a 
lack of competency "is filed pursuant to Section 
77-15-3, the court shall enter an order for a hearing 
on the mental condition of the person who is the 
subject of the petition." This statute is written in 
mandatory rather than permissive language, as it 
states that "the court shall enter an order for a 
hearing." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15- 5(1) (emphasis 
added) The trial court satisfied this hearing 
requirement by holding a hearing on March 17, 1994, 
to consider Robertson's second competency petition 
On appeal, Robertson has failed to make the 
transcript of the March 17 hearing part of the record. 
Thus, we cannot determine whether the court 
complied with the requirement of section 77-15-5(5) 
that "[t]he heanng ... be conducted according to the 
procedures outlmed in Subsections 62A-12-
234(9)(b) through (9)(f)." As we stated in Jolivet v 
Cook, " 'If an appellant fails to provide an adequate 
record on appeal, this Court must assume the 
regularity of the proceedings below.' " 784 P 2d 
1148, 1150 (Utah 1989) (quotmg State v Miller, 718 
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986)), cert denied sub nom 
Jolivet v Barnes, 493 U.S. 1033, 110 S Ct. 751, 107 
L.Ed.2d 767 (1990). Therefore, we reject 
Robertson's argument that the court erred by failing to 
hold a heanng. 
Robertson's second procedural attack on the trial 
court's handlmg of his second petition concerns the 
court's failure to enter a formal stay while the petition 
was pending, as required by section 77-15-5(6) of the 
Code. That section provides, "All other proceedmgs 
pending against the defendant shall be stayed until the 
proceedmgs to determine his mental condition are 
terminated." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(6). Here, 
the trial court did not enter such a stay Rather, the 
court scheduled hearings on additional motions and 
set the date for the jury trial. We agree that in so 
actmg, the court failed to follow the statute. 
*1227 [10][11][12][13] However, having determined 
that error was committed, we must address its 
harmfulness. An erroneous decision by a trial court 
"cannot result m reversible error unless the error is 
harmful." State v Hamilton, 827 P 2d 232, 240 (Utah 
1992). Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently 
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood 
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that it affected the outcome of the proceedings Id 
Put differently, an error is harmful only if the 
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high 
that it undermines our confidence in the verdict Id 
The burden of showing harmfulness normally rests 
with the complaining party See Ashton v Ashton 
733 P2d 147 (Utah 1987) (citing Redevelopment 
Agency v Mitsui Inv Inc 522 P 2d 1370, 1374 & n 
12 (Utah 1974)), see also State v Bishop 753 P 2d 
439, 448 (Utah 1988) (holding that "appellant has the 
burden of establishing that reversible error resulted 
from an abuse of discretion") Robertson has failed 
to carry this burden 
Robertson filed his second competency petition on 
March 3 1994 On March 17, the trial court denied 
the petition Robertson argues that the prejudice he 
suffered from the lack of a stay dunng this two-week 
period is clear However, the only prejudice he 
claims is that he was in fact incompetent to proceed 
to trial dunng this period (and afterward) We have 
already affirmed the trial court's rejection of this 
claim and the demal of the petition, therefore, we 
find no reason for concluding that the jury's verdict 
might have differed on the ultimate question of guilt 
had the trial judge formally stayed all proceedings for 
two weeks, as required by the statute [FN5] Because 
we find the trial court's error to have been harmless, 
we reject this leg of Robertson's challenge to his 
conviction 
FN5 Although Robertson has not proven 
that he was prejudiced by this error, we 
nevertheless stress the importance of 
following the statutory requirements for 
determining competency to stand trial 
We now consider Robertson's claim of error 
regarding the admission of Cassie Robertson's 
testimony against him during trial Robertson argues 
that the trial court erred in allowing his former wife, 
Cassie Robertson, to testify against him. Before 
trial, Robertson moved to exclude Cassie's testimony 
His motion was based on article I, section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution, which prevents the State from 
compelling a husband or wife to testify against his or 
her spouse, and section 78-24-8(1) of the Code, 
which under most circumstances requires the consent 
of one spouse to permit the examination of the other 
regarding any communication made by one to the 
other dunng marnage The court denied the motion 
on the grounds that the pnvilege under the 
constitution belonged solely to the witness spouse and 
that section 78- 24-8(1) was inapplicable. 
Before this court, Robertson argues that the marital 
privileges recognized by Utah law may be asserted by 
either the accused spouse or the testifying spouse 
Robertson relies on article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution and rule 502(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, the provisions recognizing a marital 
testimonial pnvilege, and section 78-24-8(1) of the 
Code and rule 502(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
which recognize marital communication privileges 
To simplify our analysis, we will discuss these 
provisions according to the type of privilege the 
provisions recognize 
[14] We begin with the provisions granting a marital 
testimonial pnvilege Marital testimonial privileges 
permit a husband or wife to refuse to testify in court 
about any matter against his or her spouse The 
traditional justifications for this privilege have been 
the prevention of marital dissension and the "natural 
repugnance in every fair-minded person to 
compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the 
other's condemnation" 8 John H Wigmore, 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2228 
(McNaughton rev 1961) If a husband or wife could 
be^compelled to testify against his or her spouse, the 
testifying spouse would be placed in the unenviable 
position of either committing perjury or testifying to 
matters that are detrimental to his or her spouse, 
which could clearly lead to mantal stnfe Mantal 
testimonial pnvileges avoid this moral hazard by 
permitting a spouse to refuse to testify 
*1228 The testimonial pnvileges found in article I, 
section 12 and rule 502(a) are identical The rule 
merely repeats verbatim the constitutional provision 
That provision states that "a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a 
husband against his wife " Utah Const art I, § 12 
(emphasis added), see also Utah R Evid 502(a) 
[15][16][17] We use our general rules of statutory 
construction to interpret these provisions "Where 
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this 
Court will not look beyond to divine legislative 
intent" Eg, Alhsen v American Legion Post No 
134, 763 P2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988) "Instead, we 
are guided by the rule that a statute should be 
construed accordmg to its plam language " Id The 
quoted language from article I, section 12 and rule 
502(a) is clear and unambiguous on its face that the 
mantal pnvilege is to be invoked, if at all, only by the 
spouse whom the state seeks to compel to testify 
This interpretation is confirmed by the advisory 
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committee note to rule 502 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, which states, "Absent constitutional 
change, the rule repeats the state constitutional 
testimonial privilege for criminal cases in 
subparagraph (a), to be asserted or waived by the 
witness spouse" Utah R Evid 502 advisory 
committee's note (emphasis added) Cassie was 
neither compelled to testify nor married to Robertson 
at the time she testified against him 
[18] Robertson attempts to avoid the plain reading of 
the constitutional language by arguing that the 
provision must be interpreted in light of the words 
"[rjights of the accused" contained m the title to 
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution He 
contends that this statement of purpose requires that 
we hold that the defendant "accused" spouse has the 
right to assert a testimonial privilege on behalf of his 
former wife who voluntarily testified This argument 
is wholly without merit While it is true that this 
court may look to the title of legislation to clarify the 
meaning of ambiguous language, the title cannot be 
used "to contradict or defeat a plainly expressed 
intent" or "to create an ambiguity or uncertainty when 
the language of the body of the act is clear " Great 
Salt Lake Auth v Island Ranching Co 18 Utah 2d 
45, 414 P2d 963, 964-65 (1966) As we noted 
above, the explicit text of article I, section 12 deals 
only with compelled testimony of one spouse against 
the other Because the language of article I, section 
12 is plain and unambiguous, this court will not rely 
on the title of this provision to try to create an 
ambiguity 
Robertson has a further argument that rule 502(a) 
gives him the nght to prevent Cassie from testifying 
While the language of rule 502(a) is identical with the 
constitution and is, therefore, silent on whether the 
privilege may be claimed by the one called to testify, 
rule 502(b) states that either spouse may claim the 
quite different marital communications privilege 
described there Robertson argues that we should 
construe rule 502(a) in light of rule 502(b)'s express 
bestowal on both spouses of the nght to claim the 
marital communications privilege We reject this 
argument As we note below, the privileges described 
in rule 502(a) and (b) are entirely different in concept 
and origin There is no basis for thinking that the 
drafters intended to expand rule 502(a)'s scope 
beyond the constitution's reach Robertson 
recognizes the fundamental identity of article I, 
section 12 and rule 502(a) when he admits that the 
rule does not import the exceptions drafted into 
502(b)'s language We find that rule 502(a) is 
neither narrower nor broader than article I, section 12 
's privilege Therefore we conclude that neither 
article I, section 12 nor rule 502(a) gives the accused 
spouse the right to invoke the marital testimonial 
privilege 
[19] We now turn to Robertson's argument that the 
marital communication privileges contained in rule 
502(b) and section 78-24-8(1) give him the nght to 
prevent Cassie's testimony Unlike marital 
testimonial privileges, mantal communication 
privileges may be asserted by either spouse, even 
following the dissolution of the marriage The 
rationale underlying marital communication 
privileges is that such privileges "secur[e] an 
expectation of privacy pertaining to confidential 
communications between spouses " Utah R Evid 
502 advisory committee note In addition, by 
securing this expectation of privacy, "marital 
communication pnvilegefs] *1229 encourage 
mantal confidences, which in turn promote mantal 
harmony" Id 
[20] We begin with rule 502(b) That rule provides 
(2) An individual has a pnvilege dumu the 
^ person's life to refuse to testify or to prevent his 
or her spouse or former spouse from testifying as 
to any confidential communication made by the 
individual to the spouse during their mainage and 
to prevent another from disclosing any such 
confidential communications 
(4) No pnvilege exists under subparagraph (b) of 
this rule 
(B) As to any communication which was made, in 
whole or in part, to enable or aid anyone 
(I) to commit, 
(n) to plan to commit, or 
(in) to conceal a crime or a tort[ ] 
Utah R Evid 502 Robertson argues that Cassie 
should have been prohibited from testifying to 
statements made by him to her during their mamage 
However, rule 502(b)(4)(B) denies the pnvilege for 
communications made to commit, to plan to commit, 
or to conceal a crime In this case, any 
communication to which Cassie testified was made in 
the course of a plan to commit or the commission of a 
cnme 
Robertson also relies on section 78-24-8(1) of the 
Code Section 78-24- 8(1), which predates the 
promulgation of rule 502 by this court, provides 
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(a) Neither a wife nor a husband may either 
during the marriage or afterwards be, without the 
consent of the other, examined as to any 
communication made by one to the other dunng 
the marriage 
(b) This exception does not apply 
(I) to a civil action or proceeding by one spouse 
against the other, (u) to a criminal action or 
proceeding for a crime committed by one spouse 
against the other, 
(in) to the crime of deserting or neglecting to 
support a spouse or child, 
(IV) to any civil or criminal proceeding for abuse 
or neglect committed against the child of either 
spouse or 
(v) if otherwise specifically provided by law 
Utah Code Ann § 78-24-8 (emphasis added) 
Robertson argues that this section lacks the 
exemption for a crime against a third person that is 
included in rule 502(b), thus giving him the nght to 
prevent Cassie from testifying We reject this 
argument 
[21] Section 78-24-8(1) does not give Robertson the 
nght to prevent Cassie from testifying because rule 
502(b)'s exception for communications made in the 
course of a plan to commit or the commission of a 
crime falls within the statute's "otherwise specifically 
provided by law" exception Rule 502(b) provides 
that the marital communications privilege does not 
apply where, as in this case, the communication is 
made in the course of a plan to commit or the 
commission of a crime Thus, the "if otherwise 
specifically provided by law" portion of section 
78-24-8(1 )(b)(v) comes into play Rule 502(b) is a 
"law" withm the meaning of section 78-24-8(1) See 
Utah Const art VIII, § 4 ("The Supreme Court shall 
adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in 
the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the 
appellate process The Legislature may amend the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the 
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all 
members of both houses of the Legislature "), Utah 
Code Ann § 78-2-4 (same), see also State v Benson 
712 P2d 256, 258 (Utah 1985) (stating that "the 
privileges provided for in section 78-24-8(1) have 
been modified by [the predecessor rule to rule 502]") 
Moreover, rule 501 states, "Except as provided in the 
Constitutions of the United States and the State of 
Utah, no person shall have a privilege to withhold 
evidence except as provided by these or other rules 
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court or by existing 
statutory provisions not in conflict with them " Utah 
R Evid 501 (emphasis added) The advisory 
committee note to rule 501 adds that 'all preexisting 
statutory privileges' are accepted 'except those 
inconsistent with these rules ' Id advisory committee 
note The note specifically *1230 indicates that 
'Utah Code Ann § 78-24-8, insofar as it defines 
privileges relating to spouses attorneys, clergy and 
physicians [is] made ineffectual by the adoption of 
rules specifically redefining those privileges ' Id 
There is no doubt that rules of evidence and 
procedure promulgated by this court under its 
constitutional power operate to supersede inconsistent 
statutory provisions State v Banner 717 P 2d 1325 
1333 (Utah 1986), see also In re Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence to be Used in the Courts of this State 
18 Utah Adv Rep 3 (Sept 10, 1985) (per curiam) 
(adopting 'all existing statutory rules of procedure 
and evidence not inconsistent with or superseded by 
rules of procedure and evidence heretofore adopted 
by this Court") Therefore, Robertson is not entitled 
to prevent Cassie from testifying because section 
78-24-8(1) is inapplicable here by virtue of its "unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law" exception 
We conclude that because Cassie was not compelled 
tot testify against Robertson and because any 
cohimunications made to her by Robertson were in 
furtherance of a crime, neither article I, section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution, rule 502 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, nor section 78-24-8(1) of the Code 
prohibits Cassie from testifying in this case 
Robertson's next claim of error relates to the trial 
court's failure to grant his motion for a mistrial 
following certain allegedly improper statements made 
in the presence of the jury These statements arose 
out of the following sequence of events First, the 
prosecutor asked Cassie why it was important that she 
explam the victim's murder to the jury Cassie 
responded "Because I did not act alone in this I 
did not act alone And he knew, just like you knew, 
and his attorney, everybody knew what would happen 
should he act crazy" Robertson's attorney then 
objected, moved to strike, and asked to approach the 
bench With the jury present in the courtroom, the 
court held a bench conference off the record and the 
prosecutor privately admonished Cassie not to refer 
to Robertson's history relating to mental illness 
Robertson's attorney then requested that the 
conversation be held someplace else, and the court 
excused the jury After the jury exited the 
courtroom, Robertson's attorney reiterated her 
objection to Cassie's response and also objected to 
the prosecutor's admonition of Cassie Robertson's 
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attorney alleged that in admonishing Cassie, the 
prosecutor stated, "These proceedings have been 
sanitized" so loudly that one of the jurors may have 
overheard the statement Concerned that the jury 
would infer from these comments that Robertson had 
feigned mental illness to avoid prosecution, 
Robertson's attorney moved for a mistrial 
In responding to ihe motion, the trial court first 
rejected Robertson's claim that any juror possibly 
overheard the prosecutor's admonishment The judge 
noted that he was sitting closer to the witness box 
than the closest juror and he could not hear the 
prosecutor's admonition Second, the court sustained 
Robertson's objection to Cassie's comment and 
ordered the comment stricken, but the court denied 
the motion for mistrial The court stated that the 
reference to the word "crazy" or "craziness" at that 
point m the trial had no meaning whatsoever to the 
jury Furthermore, the court noted that the way it 
occurred and the way it came in was such that the jury 
would not remember what Cassie said The court 
denied the motion for mistrial on the basis of its 
foregoing observations. Following its denial of the 
motion, the court instructed the jury to disregard 
Cassie's statement. 
On appeal, Robertson argues that these "improper" 
statements deprived him of the right to a fair trial by 
an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. We 
reject this argument 
[22][23][24] We will not reverse a trial court's denial 
of a motion for mistrial absent an abuse of discretion. 
State v Thomas, 830 P 2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992) At 
trial, the court must determine whether an "incident 
may have or probably influenced the jury, to the 
prejudice of [the defendant]." Burton v Zions Coop 
Mercantile Inst, 122 Utah 360, 249 P2d 514, 517 
(1952). If in exercising its discretion, the court 
concludes that the incident probably did not prejudice 
the jury, as the court did here, the court should deny 
the *1231 motion. Id. "Once the trial court has 
exercised [its] discretion and made [its] judgment 
thereon, the prerogative of this court on review is 
much more limited" Id Unless a review of the 
record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong 
in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that 
the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, 
we will not find that the court's decision was an abuse 
of discretion. Id Wre review such a decision with just 
deference because of the advantaged position of the 
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trial judge to determine the impact of events 
occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings, 
and this is especially so when what actually occurred 
is m dispute Cf State v Pena 869 P 2d 932, 
935-36 (Utah 1994) 
[25] Robertson has failed to show the requisite abuse 
of discretion The trial court determined that the 
possible prejudicial impact of Cassie's ambiguous 
statement was lost in the midst of the proceedings 
But even so, he ordered Cassie's statement stricken 
and instructed the jury to disregard it As for the 
prosecutor's comment, the court determined that it 
had not been heard by the jury From the record, we 
cannot conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Robertson's motion for a 
mistrial 
We next address Robertson's claim that the trial court 
committed reversible error when it refused to give 
either of his requested supplemental reasonable doubt 
instructions, both of which included an instruction on 
the theory of reasonable alternative hypothesis 
[26][27][28][29][30] A trial court has a duty to 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of 
the case. State v Potter, 627 P2d 75, 78 (Utah 
1981). A defendant also has the nght to have his or 
her theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear 
and comprehensible manner. State v Smith, 706 P 2d 
1052, 1058 (Utah 1985). "Whether the trial court's 
refusal to give a proposed jury instruction constitutes 
error is a question of law, which we may review for 
correctness." State v Hamilton, 827 P 2d 232, 238 
(Utah 1992) (citations omitted). However, "[i]t is 
not error to refuse a proposed instruction if the point 
is properly covered in the other instructions " State v 
Sessions, 645 P 2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982) (citations 
omitted). We review jury instructions in their 
entirety and will affirm when the instructions taken as 
a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable 
to the case. 
Robertson submitted to the court the following two 
proposed instructions: 
Instruction # 6 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon 
the State to prove Mr. Jerry Lee Robertson guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. By reasonable doubt 
is meant a doubt that is based on reason and one 
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the 
Ong. U S Govt Works 
932 P 2d 1219 
(Cite as: 932 P.2d 1219, *1231) 
understanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt which reasonable men and women would 
entertain, and it must arise from the evidence or 
the lack of evidence in this case 
If, after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all of the evidence in the case, you 
can candidly say that you are not satisfied of Mr. 
Robertson's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt. 
But if after such an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence you can truthfully 
say that you have an abiding conviction of Mr 
Robertson's guilt, such as you would be willing to 
act upon in the more weighty and important 
matters relating to your own affairs, you have no 
reasonable doubt A reasonable doubt must be a 
real, substantial doubt and not one that is merely 
possible or imaginary 
To warrant you in convicting Mr Robertson, the 
evidence must to your minds exclude every 
reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt 
of Mr Robertson. That is to say, if after an 
entire consideration and comparison of all of the 
testimony in the case you can reasonably explain 
the facts given m evidence on any reasonable 
grounds other than the guilt of the defendant, you 
should acquit him. 
*1232 Instruction #7 
I have said that the burden of proof that the State 
has is to prove that Jerry Lee Robertson is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof 
beyond all conceivable doubt. No event in human 
affairs has so absolutely certain a cause that one 
could not, through elaborate exercise of 
imagination, conceive of some other remotely 
possible explanation for what happened. In 
saying that the State must prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, what I mean is that you as 
jurors must all be satisfied that no other 
conceivable alternative explanation has any 
reasonable likelihood. If you conclude, based on 
the evidence in this case, or reasonable inferences 
therefrom, that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the events charged against the Defendant can 
be explamed on some basis inconsistent with 
guilt, then the State has not sustained its burden 
of proof. In essence, proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is proof so convincing that a reasonable 
person would not hesitate to rely on it and act on 
it in the most important of his or her own affairs. 
The court declmed to give either instruction. 
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Instead, it gave the jury the following instruction 
Instruction # 15 
All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a 
defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt In case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is 
satisfactorily shown, the defendant is entitled to a 
not guilty verdict. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon 
the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty By reasonable doubt is meant a doubt 
that is based on reason and one which is 
reasonable in view of all the evidence It must 
be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly 
speculative possibility Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which 
satisfies the mind and convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it and obviates all 
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt 
. which reasonable men and women would 
entertain, and it must arise from the evidence or 
the lack of the evidence in this case. 
The instruction the trial court actually gave is the 
same instruction the court of appeals approved in 
State v Ontiveros, 835 P 2d 201, 206 
(Utah.Ct.App 1992), State v Maestas, 815 P2d 
1319, 1324 (Utah.Ct.App.1991), cert denied, 826 
P.2d 651 (Utah 1991), and State v Pedersen, 802 
P.2d 1328, 1331 (Utah.Ct.App. 1990), cert denied, 
815 P2d 241 (Utah 1991). We conclude that the 
instruction given to the jury in this case was an 
appropriate statement of Utah law. 
[31] In State v Johnson, 114 P 2d 1141, 1147-49 
(Utah 1989), a majority of this court essentially 
adopted the analysis of Justice Stewart's dissent in 
State v Ireland, 113 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Utah 1989) 
, for reviewing the appropriateness of a reasonable 
doubt instruction. This analysis requires a three-part 
test. First, "the instruction should specifically state 
that the State's proof must obviate all reasonable 
doubt." Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 (Stewart, J , 
dissenting). Second, the instruction should not state 
that a reasonable doubt is one which "would govern 
or control a person in the more weighty affairs of 
life," as such an instruction tends to trivialize the 
decision of whether to convict. Id (Stewart, J , 
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dissenting) Third, it is inappropriate to instruct that 
a reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility,' 
although it is permissible to instruct that a 'fanciful or 
wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt" Id at 1382 
(Stewart, J, dissenting) 
[32] Here the instruction met all three tests It 
contained a clear and unambiguous statement that the 
State s proof must obviate all reasonable doubt, did 
not define reasonable doubt in terms of the "more 
weighty decisions in life," and articulated an 
appropnate definition of "reasonable doubt" Though 
the instruction did not specifically negate the *1233 
"weighty decisions of life" analogy, nothing in 
Johnson or Ireland suggests that the instruction must 
do so [FN6] We hold that this definition of 
reasonable doubt did not trivialize or diminish the 
required burden-of-proof standard 
FN6 Interestingly, both of Robertson's 
proposed instructions contained the 
impermissible analogy to the "weighty 
decisions of life ' Robertsons first proposed 
instruction stated in relevant part, '[l]f after 
an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence you can 
truthfully say that you have an abiding 
conviction of Mr Robertson's guilt, such as 
you would be willing to act upon in the 
more weighty and important matters 
relating to your own affairs, you have no 
reasonable doubt" (emphasis added) 
Robertson's other instruction stated in 
relevant part, '[P]roof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is proof so convincing that a 
reasonable person would not hesitate to rely 
on it and act on it in the most important of 
his or her own affairs " (emphasis added) 
Thus, the court would have erred if it had 
used either of Robertson's proposed 
instructions 
It is true that the court's instruction did not include a 
generalized reference to a reasonable alternative 
hypothesis, as did the proposed instructions 
However, we have clearly held that no such 
reasonable alternative need be mentioned where, as 
here, the jury is instructed that the State must prove a 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt State v 
Hansen 710 P 2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985) (citmg State 
v McClain 706 P 2d 603, 606 (Utah 1985), State v 
Burton 642 P 2d ^16, 719 (Utah 1982)) Therefore, 
we hold that the trial court did not err m refusing to 
use Robertson's proposed jury instructions 
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We now consider Robertsons final claim, which is 
that the trial court erred by imposing restitution of 
costs incurred to extradite Robertson and to house 
Robertson at the State Hospital during his period ot 
malingering Robertson does not dispute the trial 
court's authority to order restitution of extradition 
costs under section 76-3-20 l(4)(b) [FN7] and costs 
incurred by the State Hospital during his penod of 
malingering under section 77-15- 9(4) [FN8] 
Instead, Robertson argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion by imposing restitution of costs without 
considering his financial history and impecunious 
status as required under sections 76-3-20 l(4)(c) and 
77-32a-3oftheCode 
FN7 Section 76-3-201(4)(b)(i) provides 
When a defendant has been extradited to 
this state under Title 77, Chapter 30 
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal 
charges and is convicted of criminal activity 
in the county to which he has been returned, 
the court may, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, order that the 
defendant make restitution for costs 
expended by any governmental entity for the 
extradition 
Utah Code Ann § 76-3-201 (4)(b)(i) 
FN8 This section provides in part, 'If the 
defendant requested the examination and is 
found to be competent by the court the 
department may recover the expenses of the 
examination from the defendant ' Utah 
Code Ann §77-15-9(4) 
[33] "In a criminal action the court may require a 
convicted defendant to make restitution and pay 
costs" Utah Code Ann § 77-32a-l Furthermore, 
section 76-3-20 l(4)(b)(i) states that "the court may, 
in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order 
that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition " Id § 
76-3-20l(4)(b)(i) The language of both sections is 
permissive, therefore, the imposition of restitution is 
a matter left to the discretion of the court State v 
Snyder 747 P 2d 417, 420 (Utah 1987) However, 
before ordering restitution, the court must take into 
account the financial resources of the defendant 
[FN9] Utah Code *1234 Ann §§ 76-3-201(4)(c)(i), 
77-32a-3 Moreover, when the court determines 
whether restitution of extradition costs is appropnate, 
"the court shall make the reasons for the decision a 
part of the court record " Id § 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i) 
FN9 Actually, there are several factors that 
the court is directed to take into account 
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Section 76-3-20 l(4)(c) instructs the trial 
court to take the following into account 
(0 the financial resources of the defendant 
and the burden that payment of the 
restitution will impose, with regard to the 
other obligations of the defendant, 
(n) the ability of the defendant to pay 
restitution on an installment basis or on 
other conditions to be fixed by the court, 
(in) the rehabilitative effect on the 
defendant of the payment of restitution and 
the method of payment, and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court 
determines make restitution inappropriate 
Utah Code Ann § 76-3-20 l(4)(c) Section 
77-32a-3 provides 
The court shall not include in the judgment 
a sentence that a defendant pay costs unless 
the defendant is or will be able to pay them 
In determining the amount and method of 
payment of costs, the court shall take 
account of the financial resources of the 
defendant and the nature of the burden that 
payment of costs will impose and that 
restitution be the first priority 
Id § 77-32a-3 
Although the trial judge did not specifically state that 
he considered Robertson's financial condition in 
ordering restitution, as a general rule, "this court 
upholds the trial court even if it failed to make 
findings on the record whenever it would be 
reasonable to assume that the court actually made 
such findings." Ramirez, 817 P 2d at 788 n. 6 (Utah 
1991) As we discussed above, there are limited 
instances in which this assumption should not be 
made when an ambiguity of the facts makes the 
assumption unreasonable, id at 788, if the statute 
explicitly provides that written findings must be 
made, Labrum, 925 P 2d at 939-40, or when a prior 
case states that findings on a particular issue must be 
made to impress upon the trial court the importance 
of the issue so as to ensure that we can properly 
perform our appellate review function, see Nelson, 
725 P 2d at 1356 n. 3. Though the imposition of 
restitution of the State Hospital's costs does not fit 
either exception to making the Ramirez assumption, 
imposing restitution of extradition costs falls under 
the Labrum exception. 
As noted above, Robertson is correct in asserting that 
both sections 76-3-20l(4)(c)(i) and 77-32a-3 require 
the court to consider his financial status before 
ordenng restitution. Section 77-32a-3 merely 
requires the court to "take account of the financial 
resources of the defendant." While section 
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76-3-20l(4)(c)(i) contains almost identical language, 
section 76- 3-201(4)(d)(i) adds, "If the court 
determines that restitution is appropriate or 
inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall 
make the reasons for the decision a part of the court 
record" Utah Code Ann § 76-3- 201(4)(d)(i) 
(emphasis added) We read this requirement to mean 
that after taking into account the factors listed m 
section 77-3-20 l(4)(c), the trial court must take the 
additional step of explicitly noting on the record the 
reasons for the decision it reached, reflecting the 
detailed factors listed in the statute This directive 
precludes the use of the Ramirez assumption 
[34] In the present case, though the court explained 
its reasons for imposing restitution of State Hospital 
costs incurred during Robertson's penod of 
malingering, the court did not discuss on the record 
the reasons for ordering restitution of extradition 
costs Because this error occurred at the sentencing 
stage, where costs were imposed, we vacate the 
portion of the order imposing extradition costs and 
remand to the trial court for further proceedmgs in 
compliance with section 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i) 
[3£] We now address the question of whether it 
would be reasonable to assume that the trial court 
found that defendant had the ability to pay the 
restitution of costs incurred by the State Hospital 
Prior to the imposition of restitution costs at the 
sentencmg hearing, the trial court considered the 
information set forth in the presentence report. The 
transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that this 
report contained information concerning Robertson's 
education and job history Robertson did not make 
the presentence report part of the record and points to 
no inaccuracy m the report. Aside from whatever 
information concerning Robertson's financial 
resources may be in the presentence report, other 
evidence in the record reveals that Robertson may 
have the ability to pay the restitution imposed by the 
court. For example, counsel for Robertson stated 
that he had held a number of jobs prior to his 
incarceration. Robertson was also employed at the 
State Hospital coffee shop during his pretrial 
incarceration. 
The trial court's actions at the sentencmg hearing 
mdicate that it considered Robertson's financial 
resources. The court separated the costs owed to the 
State Hospital and emphasized that the restitution 
amount was conservative Significantly, the court 
used its discretion not to impose additional restitution 
for other trial costs and further declined to impose 
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any fine This indicates that the court used some 
factor to limit the amount of restitution costs imposed 
on defendant Because the court had already ordered 
defendant to pay a significant sum as restitution, this 
limiting factor was likely defendant's *1235 ability to 
pay Although the court did not make findings 
relating to Robertson's financial condition part of the 
record, we can reasonably assume that the court 
actually made such findings We hold that because 
the trial court can properly be assumed to have 
considered Robertson's financial status, it did not err 
in imposing restitution of the State Hospital costs 
We affirm the jury's verdict and the trial court's 
sentence ordering restitution of costs incurred by the 
State Hospital We vacate the trial court's order 
imposing restitution of extradition costs and remand 
the case to the trial court for further proceedings in 
compliance with section 76-3- 201(4)(d)(i) 
Justice HOWE and Justice RUSSON concur in Chief 
Justice ZIMMERMAN'S opinion. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting: 
I dissent. I submit that the majority opinion 
implicitly assumes that a finding of malingering 
equals a finding of competence. It is possible for a 
person to be malingering and incompetent at the same 
time. The trial court addressed the question of 
malmgenng, but it did not address the question of 
defendant's competence to stand trial, even though a 
petition alleging incompetence was duly filed. 
Because the trial court failed to rule on defendant's 
allegations of incompetency as required by statute, I 
would remand for the statutorily mandated treatment 
of defendant's petition, especially in light of the trial 
court's initial finding of incompetency. 
7 
On the basis of the testimony of two psychologists, 
the court initially found defendant incompetent to 
stand trial and committed him to the state hospital. 
Upon receiving reports of possible malmgenng, the 
trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on that 
question. The court ruled that defendant had been 
malmgenng, vacated its ongmal finding of 
incompetency and order of commitment, and entered 
findmgs of fact and conclusions of law. Although 
some of the testimony presented at the hearing 
consisted of opinions about defendant's competency, 
the court's findings and conclusions related solely to 
the issue of malmgenng At that point, the court 
stated that the issue of competency was at 
"equipoise," as if "the Findmg and Order [which had 
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held defendant was incompetent to stand trial] had 
never been forthcoming " The court also noted that 
defendant had the right to petition again for a 
determination of competency, which defendant did on 
March 3, 1994 
Yet the trial court has never entered an order on the 
legal question of defendant's allegations of 
incompetency, as required by Utah Code Ann § 77-
15-5(1). That provision, at the tune Robertson filed 
his second petition, stated in pertinent part [FN 1 ] 
FN1 This provision was substantiallv 
amended effective May 2, 1994, and now 
requires a preliminary ruling on the 
sufficiency of the allegations, followed by a 
full hearing if the court finds 'that the 
allegations of incompetency raise a bona 
fide doubt as to the defendant's competency 
to stand trial" 
When a petition is filed pursuant to Section 
77-15-3 the court shall enter an order for a 
heanng on the mental condition of the person 
who is the subject of the petition 
Tie tnal court in this case has not complied with this 
statutory requirement. The majority apparently 
presumes that a competency ruling is merely a factual 
findmg that is subject to the analysis presented in 
State v Ramirez, 817 P 2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) 
That is not correct. At the time Robertson filed his 
petition, section 77-15-5(1) required, and still 
requires, the court to make a specific legal 
determination about defendant's competency Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2, a person is incompetent 
to stand tnal if he is unable "to have a rational and 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him 
or of the punishment specified for the offense 
charged" or he is unable to "consult with counsel and 
to participate in the proceedmgs agamst him with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding " When 
Robertson filed his petition, the tnal court was 
required to hold an evidentiary heanng on the matter 
and rule on defendant's competency to stand tnal 
The majonty apparently argues that we can simply 
infer that factual findmgs on *1236 the competency 
issue were made to support a legal ruling that was 
never entered. Neither Ramirez nor any other case 
supports such a proposition. Even if the court had 
entered a legal ruling on the issue of competency, the 
failure to make any factual findmgs renders this case 
closely analogous to State v Labrum, 925 P 2d 937, 
940-41 (Utah 1996), which held that failure to make 
statutonly mandated findmgs may constitute 
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reversible error are nevertheless legally and logically distinct and 
cannot be conflated for purposes of competency 
determinations In short, I do not believe that trial courts can simply 
dispense with the statutory requirements of § 
77-15-5(1) and § 77-15-2, as the majority allows in 
this case Although the court did state that it "does 
not believe that the Defendant will cooperate in the 
performance of a competency evaluation and that, 
therefore, the evaluation will not render valid data," 
this statement was made pnor to the petition for 
inquiry into defendant's competency, and it related 
specifically to the court's opinion as to defendant's 
malingering behavior It therefore could not suffice 
as a ruling on defendant's allegations of 
incompetency The issues of malingering and 
competency, though inevitably somewhat interrelated, 
In the context of a fundamental decision which goes 
to the heart of the authority and ability of the state to 
try a defendant for crimes charged, I would hold that 
trial courts must make their competency rulings, 
along with detailed findings supporting those rulings, 
on the record. 
Justice DURHAM concurs in Associate Chief Justice 
STEWART'S dissenting opinion 
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